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This dissertation contains three chapters on industrial organization and
international finance.
What motivates mergers in banking? The data show that merger activ-
ity is concentrated among very large banks. A large literature on the banking
structure has studied this question by estimating cost functions and has pro-
vided mixed evidence. A crucial assumption is the exogeneity of input prices.
If this assumption fails, result may be biased. This paper adopts the produc-
tion function method proposed by [23] to separate the impact of productivity
from scale economies in banking. To avoid this bias, I use recovery rates of
non-performing loans, charge off rates, and cash holdings as proxies for pro-
ductivity. The proxy method illustrates that the industry operates with signif-
icant diseconomies of scale, while the OLS method generates opposite results.
Therefore, this finding supports the view that improvements in productivity
cause mergers, which is also consistent with data. Finally, I introduce the
Quantile Proxy Method to capture the impacts of both input endogeneity and
vi
size heterogeneity. This method reveals that medium size banks have largest
diseconomies of scale, while top 5% experience somewhat extensive economies
of scale. This result sheds light on the fact why many mergers occur among
large banks: large parties involved in a consolidation benefit from both pro-
ductivity improvements and scale economies.
In the second chapter, we extend the work of [7] to a Small Open
Economy. We introduce two additional wedges - a trend shock wedge and a
debt price (country risk) wedge. We then evaluate the contribution of these
wedges to the fluctuations in Mexico during the Tequila Crisis. Our results
suggest that trend shock wedge is crucial to account for the behavior of the
net exports and the current account during that time. Output movements are
driven primarily by the traditional, stationary efficiency wedge. The role of
debt price wedge appears to be minimal. On the theoretical side, we show
that allocations in the prototype economy with a trend shock wedge are, up to
a first-order approximation, identical to the allocations in a detailed economy
with exogenous terms of trade shocks, when the latter are random walks. We
provide evidence that in a few emerging economies terms of trade are well
approximated by a random walk process. We also show that allocations in an
economy with shocks to the world interest rate and to country spreads, cou-
pled with a working capital friction, are identical to allocations in a prototype
economy with debt price and labor wedge.
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The main contribution of the third chapter is a simple theoretical frame-
work and empirical estimations explaining the behavior of the manufacturers.
The paper focuses on the frequently-used methods of demand estimation for
discrete choice models to analyze the Iranian automobile market. It shows
how both major companies in Iran choose to produce lower quality products
and why they still charge high markups. Empirical estimations are based on
[4] to predict marginal costs and markups. Estimation results also support
the hypothesis that manufacturers are charging high markups. In addition,
the counterfactual analysis carried out supports the view that both duopolist
firms prefer to operate at lower quality rather than at higher quality produc-
tion levels. We show that a decline in tariff rates may induce firms to produce
high quality cars. Furthermore, analyses are performed using the Multino-
mial Logit methodology to better understand the Iranian automobile market.
Tastes of people with different genders and ages for some specific cars are ex-
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Chapter 1
Productivity, Scale Economies, Mergers:
Estimating a Quantile Banking Production
Function
Introduction
This paper focuses on three fundamental questions regarding the bank-
ing industry: First, what is the degree of scale economies in the banking
industry? Second, has productivity growth increased after the deregulation of
the mid 1990’s? Third, how does consolidation between two banks affect pro-
ductivity? The answers to these questions can shed light on what motivates
banks to merge with each other. Banks often claim that these mergers help
them to operate more effectively and to gain from scale economies.
It is important to know the answer to these questions to improve bank-
ing regulation. Policymakers often measure a bank’s productivity by output
per labor input. This way of calculating productivity often shows that pro-
ductivity growth in banking lags behind productivity growth elsewhere in the
economy. This measure is an incomplete gauge of efficiency, because banks can
boost output per labor by investing more and by equipping workers with bet-
ter tools in order to assess the best candidates for loans. That is, it is not clear
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that calculating productivity in this way can be compared in a meaningful way
to other industries.
The problem of gauging productivity dates back to the seminal contri-
bution, by [38] suggested a production function framework and defined tech-
nological change as the portion of output that is not explained by the amounts
of inputs used in production. Moreover, he contended that the implicit load
of assumptions is quite heavy in the conventional definition of productivity as
output per labor, and his definition is considerably more general. I employ
his approach by estimating a production function for banking. To the best of
my knowledge, the “residual” approach to productivity has not been studied
in the banking literature.
In applying this method in the context of banking it is necessary to
properly classify inputs and outputs of the financial institutions consistently
with the theory of the firm. According to [36], production in banking means
a process that transforms borrowed funds (inputs) into loans and securities
(outputs). They define the dollar volume of the various types of earning assets
as the measure of the bank’s output, which is analogous to a physical output
of a manufacturer. The volume of earning assets is generally viewed as a
stock variable from a portfolio standpoint; however, the continuing existence
of balance sheet components requires continuing flows of services on the part of
the banker to its consumers. In other words, as [30] states, earning assets and
deposits are “not comparable to a stock of Rembrandt paintings but rather
to a river, constantly renewed in the mountains and constantly disappearing
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down the valley, with the banker controlling the sluice.” This notion of input
and output is widely accepted in this literature.
Therefore, I define the total dollar value of loans and securities in a
bank’s balance sheet as its output. Similarly, labor, capital, and deposits
are considered to be inputs into the financial firm’s production process. Here,
capital is defined by the value of equity capital in the bank’s balance sheet and
labor is the total compensation of employees. As inputs, I distinguish between
checkable deposits and non-transactional deposits because in contrast to the
latter, parts of the checkable deposits are subject to a reserve requirement.1
Moreover, the ratio of these two deposits varies considerably with size, and
this ratio can potentially play a crucial role in estimation.
Defining productivity as the portion of output that is not explained by
the amounts of inputs leaves lots of room for it to account for heterogeneity in
economic performances among banks. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
describe all of the determinants of productivity in banking, but I will sketch
out some basic ideas. One factor contributing to the growth of productivity is
likely the creation of new types of deposits, each with better management of
withdrawal timing and lower risk. For example, the expansion of certificates
of deposit (CDs) and its link to commodity prices helps banks deal more
effectively with risk and reduces the possibility of a bank run. Notice that in
1Money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), that introduced with the Depository In-
stitutions Act in 1982, are included in checkable deposits, but not in the M1 definition of
money thus not subject to reserve requirement
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this example, the innovation in deposit types allows banks to produce more
output with a fixed amount of deposits. This example is consistent with the
above definition of productivity.
Another aspect of technological progress that improves productivity is
the recent development in banking operations, which enables banks to fulfil the
reserve requirement and create more loans even with no increase in capital. For
instance, a financial institution can use new legal entities like Special Purpose
Vehicles (SPEs) to isolate the entire company from a high risk project/asset.
This transfer of loans from banks to SPEs is very common when banks is-
sue mortgage-backed securities with payments coming from a pool of loans.
Because capital requirements depend on the riskiness of bank assets, these
entities tend to loosen reserve requirement constraints. Finally, the use of
internet and computer, plus, improvements in the monitoring technology all
should be counted as the rise in productivity.
Another focus of this research addresses scales economies in banking. In
fact, a large literature in banking structure has studied this question and has
obtained mixed results, although it generally contradicts the scale economy
hypothesis except at a very low size level. Most of these studies use standard
cost function estimation to examine scale economies, defined as the elasticity
of cost with respect to output. These studies assumes that input prices are
given, which rules out the possibility of the endogeneity of error terms. One
noticeable example is [18], which provides solid evidence for the dependence of
scale economies on the structure of banks capital and the intensity of diversi-
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fication. Similarly, this paper attempts to capture the impacts of endogenous
inputs that are plausibly related to productivity and estimates a production
function, in contrast to a cost function method used by [18].
To illustrate how the endogeneity of inputs with respect to unobserved
variables can bias the result and to put it more concretely, assume that





ji ζi. Here, the output (Yi) of the bank i is produced by the multi-
ple inputs (Xji) plus the unobserved productivity (Ωi). The economy of scale
for this production function is simply defined as Σαj, which is the variable of
interest. Furthermore, the Duality Theorem illustrates that the cost function













Again, the inverse elasticity of cost with respect to output (μ) is called
the degree of scale economies. As stressed by [18], the correlation of the
unobserved variables (Ωi) with the input prices (qj) leads to biased estimation
of scale economies. They put some structure on the problem by estimating
a utility function for a manager who takes into account risks associated with
production strategies as well as returns. In contrast, I will directly estimate
the production function, and thus, I deal with the quantity data rather than
the imputed price data, and I will use a proxy equation to capture the impact
of unobserved variables
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In Section 1.1, I describe some salient stylized facts about the banking
industry and outline plausible theories for mergers. Section 1.2 reviews the
proxy method introduced by [23] and discusses how it can be implemented
to estimate a banking production function. Section 1.3 presents the results
of the proxy method and shows the OLS estimates are biased. I will analyze
the behaviour of productivity after the deregulation of mid-1990’s in Section
1.4. Section 1.5 follows with a study of the productivity of the each party to
the merger. Section 1.6 develops a method that is called the Quantile Proxy
(QP) method to estimate a size-dependent production function. Section 1.7
presents the results of QP and Section 3.5 concludes.
1.1 Background
The banking industry is highly dynamic, with frequent mergers and ac-
quisitions, and where fierce competition forces unproductive banks to exit the
market. Table 1.1 shows that the number of active banks has shrunk rapidly,
from around 11,000 banks in the mid 1990’s to about 7,200 in 2007. Many
factors contributed to this decrease. However, the data show that mergers
are the dominant cause. According to FDIC statistics, there were over 6,340
mergers between 1993 and 2007 (an average of 422 per year). Only 111 of
these mergers occurred when one party was at the brink of failure. In other
words, more than 98% of mergers happened among two healthy banks with
no assistance from the Federal Reserve. Therefore, a crucial question is what
motivated those consolidations?
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Table 1.1: Balance Sheets of Banks
Year Bank Consumer Business Real Estate Security Capital Labor Checkable Non-Transnational
Loan Loan Loan Deposit Deposit
1993 10,970 22.8 50.1 58.9 94.7 19.4 0.1 48.4 103.1
1994 10,475 26.2 54.2 63.6 104.6 20.6 0.1 50.8 104.5
1995 9,946 30.1 62.6 71.2 108.8 22.7 0.1 50.6 113.7
1996 9,539 32.5 70.6 76.2 112.2 24.7 0.1 49.4 126.9
1997 9,155 33.5 75.4 83.4 128.1 27.6 0.1 48.6 140.4
1998 8,803 34.0 87.4 91.7 143.2 31.0 0.1 48.7 157.1
1999 8,586 33.5 96.8 100.3 148.2 32.8 0.1 46.0 169.6
2000 8,317 35.6 103.6 114.1 156.3 35.2 0.1 44.3 184.7
2001 8,098 37.4 104.3 122.4 175.0 39.4 0.1 45.3 203.7
2002 7,890 41.3 100.4 136.2 192.3 43.8 0.1 45.9 224.7
2003 7,778 42.9 99.2 154.5 213.7 47.1 0.1 48.6 244.4
2004 7,637 46.9 103.1 171.3 230.1 53.8 0.1 49.2 263.0
2005 7,527 48.3 106.0 190.6 238.4 59.7 0.1 48.9 283.7
2006 7,407 47.2 114.3 207.8 253.8 64.5 0.1 45.7 301.8
2007 7,293 48.4 126.6 223.9 272.7 69.5 0.1 43.0 315.2
Numbers are unweighed average and in real term, 1983 equals 100
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Table 1.1 demonstrates that the average bank size has steadily increased
since 1993. For instance, in 2007 the average value of bank loans is three
times the level it was in 1993. Similarly the average volume of deposits has
increased about 2.4-fold during the same period. These facts may support
the idea that market power encourages banks to consolidate. Indeed, looking
at the market share of the very top banks indicates that a few giant banks
have become dominant. For example in 2010, the top five banks hold more
than 40% of total loans in the national market, while in 1993 only 17% of
total loans originated with the top five banks. In the literature, one standard
way economists use to examine concentration is to calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Figure 1.1 plots the national HHI index based on
the market shares of different assets: securities, real estate loans, business
loans, and consumer loans. Interestingly, for all asset types the HHI indices
have increased by at least 6 times; however, based on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines the banking industry is still categorized as an “unconcentrated
market” with no sign of an excessive market power.2
Deriving the HHI from national data disregards the fact that retail
banking is inherently a regional operation; that is, the commercial banks de-
liver services to local consumers. [15] document that depositors take into
account distances to financial institutions in their utility, so that the cross-
price elasticities between “close” banks are larger than those between “far”
2The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are published by U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and is accessible through
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html
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Figure 1.1: National HHI Index


















banks. Therefore, I calculate the average HHI indices based on bank deposits
for all metropolitan areas in the US. Figure 1.2 displays these HHI indices for
different quantiles of income and population. Interestingly, these HHI indices
are larger for metropolitan areas with scattered population and poorer neigh-
bourhoods. This means that the larger the transportation cost or the smaller
the demand, the higher is concentration. Given the rather moderate levels of
concentration in banking, it seems unlikely that the main motivation for bank
merger is the acquisition of market power. Therefore, I will seek elsewhere for
a explanation.
A second candidate explanation is that merging banks seek economies
of scale. As explained above, the economy of scale arises when costs of produc-
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Figure 1.2: Metropolitans HHI Index







































ing the same amounts of outputs decline after a consolidation. Many bankers
report economies of scale as the main advantage of a merger. For instance,
one year after the colossal consolidation of two giant banks: National Bank
and Bank of America, the bank’s annual report states “(because of) last year’s
historic merger · · · size and scale in key businesses allow us to offer customers
and clients a wide choice of products and delivery methods at the lowest pos-
sible cost.” 3 There is no way to evaluate these affirmations by just looking
at data because revenues and costs are all endogenous variables, which are
moved due to many factors unrelated to the merger. Therefore, answering to
this question needs a banking framework to measure economies of scale, and
this is what I intend to do in this paper.
3The full report can be downloaded from http://media.corporate-
ir.net/mediafiles/irol/71/71595/reports/1998ar.pdf
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A third explanation is that consolidation may lead to higher productiv-
ity; that is, banks operate more efficiently after the merger. As defined before,
productivity is that portion of output that is not explained by the amounts of
inputs used in production. In contrast, other papers, for example [25] focuses
on the efficiency concept: defined as a gap between the actual and the opti-
mal performance. These theories model the behavior of banks when they are
maximizing profits or minimizing costs. My definition of productivity is free
of any optimization hypothesis and depends on the assumptions on technology
alone. Therefore,compared to other definitions, the productivity concept used
in this paper may address more broadly the pros and cons of consolidation .
There is also some concern about how productivity is defined in this
paper. For example, any amelioration in diversification or reduction in risk will
be counted as an improvement in productivity. This change in productivity
can be either a consequence of better risk management or just operating in
a larger scale. As a result, I distinguish between “the economy of scale” and
“scale effects”. The former is a movement along the production frontier due
to operating in larger sizes, while the latter is mainly a shift of the frontier
because of larger scale. Some examples of these scale effects include: the
consolidated portfolio of two bank with distinct specialities is less risky than
each separate portfolio of them, or any interstate merger likely will lead to
reduced risk as long as the income of the states are not perfectly correlated.




First, I start with some assumptions about the functional form of pro-
duction. Output, defined as the sum of loans and securities, is a function
of inputs and productivity. As argued before, inputs are checkable deposits
(ct), non-transactional deposits (nt), labor (lt), and capital (kt). Checkable
deposits include bank accounts from which depositor can write a check to a
third party. Non-interest bearing checking accounts, interest bearing NOW
accounts, and money market deposit accounts are all examples. In contrast,
non-transactional deposit accounts can not be used to write a check for others;
and thus, they are offered with higher interest rates and with longer maturi-
ties. These accounts are divided into two types: saving accounts and time
deposits (known as certificates of deposit). Table 1.1 shows that the share of
non-transactional deposits have raised from 68% of total deposits in 1993 to
88% of total deposits in 2007. In other words, banks have shift their liabilities
from short term to more manageable long term deposits.
Likewise, I define the labor input as total compensation of employees.
The capital in bank’s production function consists of two main components:
physical capitals (like buildings and land) and equity capitals, which are re-
ported in the bank’s balance sheets.4 Substituting these inputs into the Cobb-
4Physical capital is an tiny portion of total, so called, capital. For robustness check, when
I include this component into non-transactional deposit, the final result doesn’t change
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Douglas technology and taking its logarithm lead to the following equation:
yit = β0 + βllit + βccit + βkkit + βnnit + ωit + ηit︸ ︷︷ ︸
εit
(1.2.1)
This is the production function for the bank i, where all inputs are in
the logarithmic form and t is a time index. Here, εit is the total error term
composed of two terms: the bank’s i unobserved productivity at the quarter
t (ωit) and an iid component denoted by ηit. The key difference of these two
components is that ωit is a state variable, and banks react to its variation.
Therefore, estimating equation 1.2.1 using the OLS method may yield to a
biased estimation of coefficients, if input variables are correlated with the
unobserved productivity. As shown in Appendix II, the estimated coefficients
of the OLS regression (β̂) can be represented as a function of the true values
of the coefficients (β) and cross correlations of right hand side variables (σ):
β̂l = βl + αll(σ̂n,n + σ̂c,c + σ̂k,k)σl,ω − αlkσ̂k,lσk,ω − αclσ̂c,lσc,ω − αlnσ̂n,lσn,ω(1.2.2)
Where αjs are strictly positive parameters, and σ̂a,b are cross correla-
tions between the input a and the variable b. Although in a multivariate model,
it is usually impossible to sign, per se, the bises of the OLS coefficients, the
following analysis may highlight how the biases arise due to the endogeneity
of inputs. If inputs are possitively correlated with each other (i.e. σ̂a,b > 0),
which is the case in this industry and only labor responds to a productivity
shock (i.e. σl,ω > 0 and σk,ω = σc,ω = σd,ω = 0), so based on equation 1.2.2 its
OLS estimate is biased upward. On the other hand, because of the positive
13
response of labor to productivity, the OLS underestimates the effects of capital
and other inputs. The following equations underline this argument:
↑︷︸︸︷



















In sum, the simultaneity problem in the standard OLS method leads
to a biased estimation of the coefficients. It is worth mentioning that a large
body of banking literature have performed the OLS method to estimate cost
functions. As a result their findings may be affected by this simultaneity
problem.
To solve the simultaneity problem, an alternative approach is proposed
by [29] and [23]. In general, they introduce a structural equation along with
equation 1.2.1, which contains a proxy variable as well as productivity. For
example, Olley-Pakes use an equation that write investment as a function of
the current level of productivity and the state of capital. Therefore, in this
example the investment acts like a proxy for productivity because given the
state of the capital the higher the productivity, firms invest more. Similarly,
Levinsohn-Petrin consider the demand for a freely variable input, for instance
electricity usage. Next, in the same spirit, they introduce the intermediate
input’s demand function as an structural equation, which again is a monotonic
function of productivity and also depends on other fixed state variables. In
sum, the Levinsohn-Petrin method uses the demand of a intermediate input
as a proxy for the firm’s productivity.
14
In the same way, I apply a proper modified version of their proxy ap-
proach for financial institutions. In banking, neither the investment decision
nor the intermediate input demands is an applicable candidate for a proxy in
banking, mainly because of lack of data for physical capital investment and
demand of an intermediate input like electricity uses. Alternatively, I argue
that either recovery rates or cash holdings can be employed as a proxy for pro-
ductivity. To illustrate why banks with higher productivity required to hold
less amounts of cash in their balance sheet, consider banks with better tim-
ing management of deposits. Empirically, these institutions hold high quality
deposits with settled timings of withdrawal. Thus, they only need to hold a
minimum level of cash, with no risk of runs. Compared to saving accounts
that can be withdrawn at any time, CDs which generally have a fixed matu-
rity length can be rated as a high quality deposit, albeit one that costs more.
Therefore, the productivity that arises from X-efficiency in management allows
banks to have less cash in their balance sheets.
To set up a structural model for cash holdings, some institutional knowl-
edge is necessary. First, based on the above discussion the cash holding equa-
tion is a decreasing function of productivity. Banks decide on their required
cash reserves based on their past amounts of checkable and non-transactional
deposits. Ideally, banks take into account maturities of these deposits; in
particular, past deposits that mature in this period. Once again, because of
limitations in data I use deposits lagged one quarter. Finally, because the
structure of the bank is also a determinant factor in the cash holding, I em-
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ploy lagged amounts of cash as another explanatory variable. Therefore, I set
up the structural cash holding equation as following 5:
sit = S(ωit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1) (1.2.3)
Here, sit is the value of cash in the bank’s i balance sheet at quar-
ter t. The next step is to obtain productivity from equation 1.2.3. The as-
sumption that S is a monotonic function of its first argument allows me to
invert the function S and to derive the productivity as a function of other
variables: ωit = Ω(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1).6 Replacing this equation into
equation 1.2.1 results in:
yit = β0+βllit+βccit+βkkit+βnnit+Ω(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1)+ηit (1.2.4)
Defining Φ as Φ(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1) = Ω(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1)+
βnnit simplifies equation 1.2.4 and makes it ready for estimation:
yit = β0 + βllit + βccit + βkkit + Φ(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1) + ηit (1.2.5)
5In the Appendix III, I introduce two other proxies for productivity in the banking
industry: “charge-off rate” and “recovery rates of non-performing loans”. These proxies are
a tad different from the standard proxy, because the standard proxy represent an structural
decision equation, while both “charge-off rate” and “recovery rate” are like exogenous
functions of productivity. Their structural equation are :
Charge− offit = C(ωit, nit, Charge− offi,t−1)
Recoveryit = R(ωit, nit, Recoveryi,t−1)
6In my empirical estimation for this equation, productivity is monotonic with respect
to cash holding in the region
(
S̄t − 4std(St), S̄t + 4std(St)
)
, when other variables in the
equation 1.2.3 are at their average levels. Here, S̄t and std(St) are respectively the average
and the standard error of cash holding. Interestingly, the relationship is also negative for
this example.
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Importantly, the assumption that ηit are iid random variables ensures
that all regressors in equation 1.2.5 are orthogonal to error terms. Therefore,
in the first stage an estimator that is linear in l, c, k and non-parametric in Φ
arguments can be used to obtain consistent estimates of βl, βc, βk. Following
Levinsohn-Petrin, I use the OLS to estimate equation 1.2.5 with a third-order
polynomial in sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, and si,t−1 to approximate Φ(.). Notice that
it is crucial to get a consistent estimates of βl, βk, and βc, because they will
be used in the second stage. Moreover, given the result of this estimation I
can calculate Φit for all banks.
In the second stage, because Ω(.) has a linear term of nit, this term ap-
pears twice in the function Φ, and another assumption is required to estimate
βn. Olley-Pakes assume that productivity follows a first-order Markov pro-
cess, hence its expectation can be calculated by a linear operator E[ωit|ωi,t−1].









ωit = Φ̂it − βnn
ζit = yit − β̂llit − β̂ccit − β̂kkit − βnnit − Ê[ωit|ωi,t−1]
Where β̂ comes from the first stage, and Ê[ωit|ωi,t−1] is an expectation
operator given the Markov assumption.7 This estimator produces a consistent
7For example it can be represented by
Ê[ωit|ωi,t−1] = α0 + α1ωi,t−1 + α2ω2i,t−1 + α3ω3i,t−1
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estimates of βn because ζit, that is the residual of the productivity process, and
ηit are orthogonal to nit. Moreover, the calculated productivities (line 2 of the
equation 1.2.6) are consistent and will be used in Section 1.4 and 1.5 to study
their dynamics. Finally, to measure the precision of coefficients I employ the
bootstrap method because calculating the standard error is so hard in this two
step approach. Two resampling procedures are applied in this paper: resample
banks and take all records belong to these banks, or resample all observations.
Next, for each sample all parameters are estimated using the proxy method
explained above. Given the distribution of bootstrap parameters, standard
errors can be computed easily.
1.3 Estimation Result
‘ This section reports the coefficients of the standard method (OLS) and
of the proxy approach to highlight the importance of dealing with endogeneity
in freely variable inputs. Table 1.2 shows the results of estimating a production
function for financial institutions using the standard method and the proxy
approach with different proxies. The first column depicts the coefficients from
the OLS regression. It shows moderate scale economies for banks and displays
a large share of capital in production. In particular, this estimates imply
that capital is solely responsible for about 45% of production, but Table 1.1
documents that capital accounts for an average of 10% of total bank liabilities.
Where α’s are the result of OLS estimation. Notice that α’s depends on the value of βn and
thus for each iteration must be recalculated.
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This discrepancy can be attributed to the role of capital in banking. Capital
serves more than just provides liabilities for loans. The more capital lowers
the risk of banking, so it provides assurance to make more. Therefore, it is
intuitive that the share of capital in production is higher than its portion of
liabilities.
Moreover, a coefficient in the production function can be interpreted
as the share of the corresponding input in total costs. Based on official re-
ports the employee salaries and benefits on average account for about 30% of
total interest and non-interest expenses.8 Therefore, an estimate of βl = 0.15
determines that the role of labor in production is less than its expense share.
However, one might argue that accounting reports understate the share of
capital when calculating interest expense. Nevertheless, comparing inputs’
various coefficients can reveal their respective weights. For instance, in afore-
mentioned official reports total interest deposit expenses account for about
33% of total expenses while my estimates shows a share of around 36%. In
sum, the standard method highlights the weight of capital and plays down the
role of labor in production.
Section 1.2 explored the possibility that the bias in the OLS estimate
of coefficients is caused by the endogenous inputs choice of bankers in re-
sponse to productivity shocks. One possible solution to this problem is the
proxy method. Table 1.2 shows the results of the proxy method with different
8Table CB07 in http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob
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Table 1.2: Production Function for Financial Institutions.
Variable OLS Proxy Method
Proxy: Cash Charge-off Rate Recovery Rate
labor 0.157*** 0.090*** 0.100*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
checkable deposit 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.100*** 0.109***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
non-transactional deposit 0.352*** 0.358*** 0.400*** 0.4220***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018)
capital 0.457*** 0.312*** 0.348*** 0.328***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
scale economies 1.046*** 0.879*** 0.950*** 0.946***
(0.002) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is output that is sum of loans and securities.
proxies: cash holdings, charge-off rates, and recovery rates of non-performing
loans. Importantly, the labor coefficient is smaller in all proxy estimations
than the result of the standard OLS model. The decline in the labor effect
is in line with the finding of Levinsohn-Petrin. Their main argument is that
labor is more responsive to technology shocks and adjusts more freely com-
pared to other inputs. As a result, in a method that ignores productivity in its
estimation, the effects of productivity on output enter in the labor coefficient.
Therefore, because of positive correlation of labor and productivity, the OLS
overestimates the labor coefficient.
Significantly, the two approaches have dissimilar outcome for scale
economies. The standard model displays moderate scale economies, where
20
the proxy model shows small diseconomies of scale. I note that even with
diseconomies of scale, merging parties may benefit from increased scale if that
makes it easier to achieve efficiencies.
How does one test for the endogeneity of inputs and their dependence
on productivity? For this purpose, table 1.3 documents the OLS regression of
inputs one by one on productivity and other inputs. As is clear from this table,
all inputs would significantly depend on the productivity, which confirms why
OLS yields to a biased estimation. Furthermore, the larger the coefficient of
the productivity, that the greater the biases of the OLS. This illustrates why
in table 1.2 the highest difference between the OLS and the proxy method
appears in the capital and the labor coefficients. In the next section I will
investigate on other aspects of productivity behavior.
1.4 Productivity
This section studies and compares the productivity estimates derived
by the above methods. It is worth mentioning that the productivity in the
standard method is the same as the Solow residual in the real business cycle
literature, while the productivity in the proxy method is calculated by invert-
ing the proxy equation. Figure 1.3 depicts the histogram of productivity for
years 1993 and 2007. The right digram graphs the result of the OLS method
and the left one shows the result of the proxy method using the cash holding
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Table 1.3: Endogeneity of Inputs
Labor Capital Checkable Non-transactional
Deposit Deposit
productivity 0.868*** 1.653*** -0.366*** -0.571***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
capital 0.199*** 0.084*** 0.685***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
checkable 0.317*** 0.032*** 0.081***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
non-transactional 0.283*** 0.479*** 0.151***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Labor 0.175*** 0.737*** 0.355***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -8.165*** -3.396*** 5.189*** 4.905***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)
Observations 533,329 533,329 533,329 533,329
R-squared 0.887 0.908 0.760 0.880
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1
Regression of inputs on the calculated productivity and other inputs
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Histogram distribution of productivity in 1993, 2007, right graph is the result of the OLS
estimation and left graph depicts the proxy method result. Vertical axis is the frequency.
as the proxy equation.9
Figure 1.3 implies that the kurtosis of the productivity distribution has
decreased about 15% in recent years compared to 1993. In other words, the
mass of firms in the middle of the distribution and the peakedness of pro-
ductivity histogram have dropped. Interestingly, the histograms for 2007 and
1993 illustrate that the thickness of the right tail is unchanged. Therefore, a
heavier tail hasn’t caused the decline in the peakedness of the profile. More-
over, the average productivity remained unchanged between 1993 and 2007,
but the standard error has slightly decreased. Finally, as is clear in the right
panel of Figure 1.3 the productivity distribution shifted toward the right in
2007 compared to 1993, and a standard distribution test demonstrates that
9The diagrams for other proxies are similar to these results
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Figure 1.4: Productivity Dynamics































Evolution of average financial institutions productivity between 1993-2007, right panel is
OLS result and left panel draws the proxy method result. Vertical axis is log productivity.
log-normal distributions can best describe both graphs.
In banking, productivity growth has long been the focus of government
reports on the industry. Typical findings support the view that the productiv-
ity grows at around 1.5% percent annually, compared to 4% annual growth for
manufacturing industries. In contrast, the models used in this paper predict
less than one percent annual growth of the productivity.
As is depicted in Figure 1.4, the OLS result shows steady growth for
the banks productivity between 1993-94, then a sharp decline on the first
quarter of 1995 continued with “wobbling” growth until 2006, with subsequent
deterioration. In contrast, for the mid-nineties the proxy estimates display a
deterioration in banking productivity during 1993-1997, which is in line with
findings reported by [3]. Strikingly, the proxy model finds rapid productivity
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growth in a period shortly before the end of the 2001 crisis until 2003Q3, with
an average annual growth rate of 12%. For the rest of the period, the proxy
results indicate very low productivity growth in banking.
The next step is to provide some insights into the structural determi-
nants of the variation in productivity among banks. Previous research has
suggested that optimal scale, scope, and diversification can improve efficiency
in banking ( [25]). To better understand how size influences productivity, con-
sider the technological adoption of two very different banks: one with over
1000 branches all across the country, and one small financial institution with a
single branch.10 In this environment a new innovation such as a new internet
tool, introduced in the market. The large bank will employ this technology
extensively in its operation to facilitate the connection between branches and
provide better financial services for consumers, and to form inter-bank rela-
tionships. In contrast, the small bank never needs to use this product and
never gains from this innovation. Although, not the same as the normal defi-
nition of economies of scale, this efficiency is definitely related to scale.
With respect to economies of scope, if there are productive comple-
mentarities between outputs, then producing these products is efficient. For
example, monitoring real estate loans and consumer loans requires an extensive
collection and analysis of data. Obviously, detailed knowledge of consumers’
10Notice that a bank with just one branch is not a hypothetical assumption. In 1993
about 40% of commercial banks operate with a unit institution. This share is still high in
2007 and around 27% of all banks
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financial histories helps banks to improve their assessments of the credit wor-
thiness of mortgage loans. Therefore, having both types in the asset portfolio
may provide an information processing advantage. Similarly, a diverse pool
of complement securities allows banks to reduce risks and transaction costs.
In addition to scale and scope, it is obvious that a risk reduction caused by a
diversification achieves to higher productivity.
To evaluate the impact of these factors on productivity, I regress the
productivity estimates from the OLS and the proxy method son a set of ex-
planatory variables. There are: size, index of diversification, share of loans in
total assets, and other variables that are shaping the structure of a bank. To
construct the diversification index, I update the index proposed by [17], which
is gauged by a bank’s exposure to macroeconomic risks. It is based on the idea
that the more geographically diverse the branches, the bank is less vulnerable
to macroeconomic risks.
To construct the diversification index, I first compute a variance-covariance
matrix, V, of unemployment rates in all states over the period 1993-2007.
Next, I calculate the portion of state j deposit in bank i, at quarter t as sijt
with vector Sit = [s1jt, · · · , s50jt]. These deposit shares serve as weights for
the diversification indices defined by 1/(S ′itV Sit)
1/2. This index states that If
a unit-institution bank operates in a state with a low variance, then it has a
higher diversification index compared with a bank in a state with high vari-
ance. Similarly, entering a new state increases the bank’s diversification index
because the economic performance of the new state likely is not perfectly cor-
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Table 1.4: Productivity Determinants
Proxy OLS
size 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.168*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
diversification 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
portfolio concentration 0.201*** 0.184*** 0.217*** 0.147***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
branch number -0.008*** -0.041***
(0.000) (0.001)














Constant 1.726*** 1.650*** 1.802*** -0.002*** -0.084*** -0.189***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
observations 495,911 495,911 486,645 497,246 497,246 487,916
R-squared 0.783 0.790 0.810 0.023 0.037 0.097
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression of calculated productivity on size, diversification, portfolio choices and other variables
of bank’s structure. Explanatory variable in the left (right) panel is calculated productivity from
proxy method (ols).
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rolated with the current bank’s portfolio. In contrast to [17] that used this
definition for one year, my indices vary over time because of many interstate
consolidation after 1997.
I define the portfolio concentration as the sum of the square shares





i for a bank with four types of output: consumer loans, busi-
ness loans, read estate loans, and securities. In table 1.4 the branch number
is counts of branches operating under a bank’s title. The branch spread is an
average distance (in miles) of the bank’s branches from its headquarter. Other
structural variables in Table 1.4 are calculated by using demographic data of
branch locations. For instance, the house variable is an average number of
houses in the zip codes where a bank’s branches are located.
Among other things, the interesting result visible in Table 1.4, is the
impact of size and diversification on productivity: controlling for every other
variable the larger the size of a bank, the higher its productivity. In addition,
the size coefficient is large in magnitude compared to other variables. This
result suggests that banks gain from improving productivity because of oper-
ating in a larger size, although they may not benefit from economies of scale.
This effect is called scale efficiency, compared to economies of scale, and it
shift the production frontier in the same way as other efficiency does.
Another key result is that diversification improves productivity with a
much smaller magnitude compared to size but still significant. For example,
in the proxy regression a one-standard-deviation increase in the size raises
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Table 1.5: Distribution of Consolidation
acquired bank
size rank 1 2 3 4 5 sum
1 0.025 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.036
acquirer 2 0.032 0.022 0.006 0.007 0.017 0.084
bank 3 0.044 0.027 0.016 0.011 0.030 0.128
4 0.044 0.035 0.032 0.022 0.090 0.223
5 0.026 0.042 0.074 0.092 0.291 0.525
sum 0.171 0.128 0.128 0.134 0.435
Share of each pair of size-rank in total consolidations between 2000-2007
the productivity by 0.9 standard deviations, and the same exercise for the
diversification improves the productivity by 0.01 standard deviations. These
positive impacts also hold for the OLS results, and again the size impact is
more pronounced. Surprisingly, portfolio concentration promotes productivity.
That is, this exercise provide no evidences for economies of scope.
1.5 Merger
What motivates banks to consolidate? As demonstrated above, many
studies argue that two factors cause consolidation in banking: improvements
in efficiency and economies of scale. Providing evidence to assess these causes
requires setting up a model to measure both efficiency and economies of scale.
In other words, there is no direct evidence in the data that can support which
one is the main cause of consolidation. However, some stylized facts may prove
useful.
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Table 1.5 reports the distribution of consolidation based on the sizes
of parties. I rank financial institutions by their asset values in five equal
quantiles: the smallest banks in group 1 and the top 20% banks in group 5 11.
Then, I counted numbers of mergers in each pair-group to compute the share
of each pair in the total consolidations. Importantly, Table 1.5 shows that
about one third of the consolidations occur among top 20% of banks. Section
1.7 attempts to answer the question why large banks are more likely to merge?
Significantly, Table 1.5 shows that acquirer banks are on average larger than
acquired banks. Consequently, it may therefore imply that the acquirers are
more productive than acquired banks because productivity increases by size,
as documented before.
Figure 1.5 shows the average productivity of acquirer and acquired
before and after a merger. Improvement in productivity can be proposed as
a primary cause of consolidation if after the merger either the productivity
growth rises or the less efficient bank performs as well as the more productive
one. Noticeably, the proxy method predicts that productivity improves in
the short run aftermath of a consolidation. In contrast, an opposite picture
is depicted by the OLS result, where after a consolidation the productivity
deteriorates both in the short run and in the long run. In addition, the Proxy
model suggest that acquirers are on average more productive than acquired
banks, while an opposite is reported by the OLS.
11Because numbers of financial institutions are decreasing during years, numbers of banks
in each group is different in each year. That said, on average numbers of institutions in each
group is about 2000 banks.
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Productivity of banks before and after a consolidation, the right (left) panel is the OLS
(proxy) result
The discussion of Table 1.5 points out that because productivity in-
creases with size, we expect that banks emerged from consolidation become
more productive. This view is consistent with the explanation provided by the
proxy estimation. However, It is natural to ask whether it can be confirmed
by other evidence directly from the data. Table 1.6 shows two other patterns
in banking. I focus on two variables in the data that can serve as a basis for
productivity: income per asset and asset growth. For instance, the higher the
productivity, the larger both the income per asset and the asset growth of the
bank. Interestingly, both indices show an increasing trend after consolidation,
which is consistent with the proxy results. Moreover, these evidences are again
in accord with the proxy results in which acquirers are more productive than
acquired banks.
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Table 1.6: Stylized Facts on Productivity Dynamics
pre-merger post merger
acquired acquirer new bank
productivity proxy 2.03 2.14 2.21
std 0.01 0.01 0.01
productivity OLS 0.03 0.01 -0.01
std 0.00 0.00 0.00
income per asset 200.42 240.35 257.76
std 4.90 13.12 4.58
asset growth 2.54% 4.53 % 5.09 %
std 1.02% 0.79% 0.86%
Average of variables two years before and after acquisition.
Another interesting comparison is between the distribution of consoli-
dation produced by each method. Table 1.7 shows the distribution of merger
conditional on size. The left panel (proxy outcome) illustrates that 25% of
mergers occur within the top-quantile banks, but this probability is quite small
for the non-large banks. In contrast, the OLS result (right panel) depicts close
to a uniform distribution with respect to size; that is, scale contributes equally
for all size banks.12 As before, the proxy result is in line with the fact that
the willingness to merger is more pronounced among larger banks. To see
this, remember that productivity is positively correlated with size, and if large
banks consolidate more often, the distribution of mergers must be more skewed
toward high productivity levels.
In sum, the proxy model rules out scales economies as a key explana-
12Likewise, the quantile estimation in the next section support this conclusion
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Table 1.7: Productivity Distribution among Mergers
acquired bank
proxy OLS
quantile 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.025 0.061 0.048 0.041 0.037 0.042
acuirer 2 0.020 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.044 0.055 0.041 0.035 0.028 0.039
bank 3 0.026 0.028 0.019 0.020 0.049 0.052 0.040 0.034 0.031 0.042
4 0.030 0.033 0.036 0.030 0.073 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.038
5 0.012 0.035 0.068 0.094 0.271 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.038 0.067
Share of each pair of productivity-rank in total consolidations between 2000-2007, Right
(left) panel is for OLS (proxy) model
tion for bank mergers; however, it provides evidence that all parties benefit
from the productivity growth and improvements in efficiency. This result is
consistent with the fact that banks experience rapid asset growth and a higher
income per asset after a merger. Moreover, the proxy model depicts a skewed
distribution of mergers toward high productivity levels. In contrast, the OLS
model highlights the role of scale economies and shows a deterioration in pro-
ductivity after a merger. It displays a uniform distribution of merger across
banks with different productivity levels.
1.6 Quantile Model
One concern that has been raised frequently both among empirical
economists and within policy makers, is whether technology used by large
banks differs from what employed by small banks. The difference in the tech-
nology can be attributed to a number of causes, including institutional factors
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and banking structures. For instance, in recent years it has been argued over
and over that large banks have been strengthened by regulation because they
are subject to too big to fail, and their connections and lobbies help them to
secure their equities in the market and benefit from government programs (like
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP))
Moreover, many papers contend that large banks operate with differ-
ent organizational structures compared to small banks. For instance, [39]
discusses that small banks widely use “soft” information that can not be cred-
ibly transmitted. Thus, a unit institution structure with single manager is
more appropriate for very small banks. In contrast, large banks generate and
use “hard” and verifiable information to pass along inside the banks, which
performs better in a large hierarchical institution. [3] provides evidences for
the different information technologies used by large and small banks. In par-
ticular, they show that bank-firm relationships tend to be stronger for small
banks. In contrast, large banks frequently lend to larger firms with farther
away distances from them.
As is shown in Table 1.8 the structure of the bank’s balance sheet are
apparently dissimilar for different sizes. Although the input portfolio is an en-
dogenous decision, this table demonstrates that capital constitutes about 17%
of the total input values for very large banks, around 10% for middle banks,
and for very small banks more than 40%. This U-shaped profile of the capital
share adjusts by more utilization of non-transactional deposit. In other words,
as banks get larger, they can attract additional large denomination deposits
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Table 1.8: Banks Input Portfolio
Input low 1% low 10% low 50% top 50% top 10% top 1%
Capital 44.0 18.7 13.3 11.1 13.7 17.3
Labor 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Checkable Deposit 21.0 24.9 25.1 21.6 15.4 15.7
Non-transactional Deposit 34.5 56.1 61.4 66.6 70.9 66.6
The share of inputs in banks’ balance sheets for different bank sizes.
with longer maturities. These structural shifts underline the importance of
studying a size dependent technology for policy making, i.e. the interbank
regulations.
Many empirical papers on banking structure also highlight the impor-
tance of size in scale economies. [16] stress that the scale economies can vary
among banks with different size, and in contrast to earlier studies, they show
that large banks benefit from considerable scale economies. Interestingly, they
document that standard cost function estimation fails to show scale economies
for large banks, while their method provides an opposite conclusion because
it can control for trade-offs between risk and return associated with different
investment strategies. That is, capturing the endogeneity of risks entails an
estimation with considerable scale economies for very large banks. The afore-
mentioned facts and these findings support the view that the proxy approach
may lead to a wrong conclusion for very large banks and it deserves more
scrutiny.
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To address this issue in the context of the production function estima-
tion, I extend the Levinsohn-Petrin method by introducing a two step quantile
regression. It is useful to remember that in the standard proxy model, the
intermediate input demand is assumed to be a monotonic function of produc-
tivity, as a result unobserved variables can be constructed by inverting this
demand system (Equation 1.2.3). Despite its straightforward intuition, a cru-
cial implicit restriction is imposed during the estimation by assuming that the
input demand of all firms can be modeled by an identical equations. It can
bias the results, in particular when firms behave differently as they become
larger.
The homoheneity assumption is imposed when a linear OLS regression
is used to estimate the production function. It can be relaxed to a weaker
assumption by employing a quantile approach, where the monotonicity of the
demand system with respect to productivity must hold as a core assumption.
Indeed, the quantile approach is built based on the assumption that banks
with the same size using a similar technology. Importantly, the results of
the quantile method can be exploited to construct a test for the homogeneity
assumption imposed by the OLS regression.





l lit + β
τ
c cit + β
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kkit + Φ
τ (sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1) + ητit (1.6.1)





are consistent estimates of the input coefficients for quantile τ . To apply this
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method [19] introduces the check function defined by ρτ (η) = η(τ − I(η < 0)).
This loss function puts the weight τ − 1 (τ) for all observations below (above)














yit − β0 − βllit − βccit − βkkit (1.6.2)
−Φ(sit, nit, ni,t−1, ci,t−1, si,t−1; βΦ)
)
Where Φ̂τ (.|βτΦ) can be computed using the estimated βτΦ. Next step is to
establish the second stage to estimate the coefficient of non-transactional de-
posit. In contrast to the proxy model, herein I assume that the productivity at
each quantile follows a first-order Markov process independent of movements
in other quantiles, hence its expectation can be determined by E[ωit|ωi,t−1].










ζit = yit − β̂τl lit − β̂τc cit − β̂τkkit − βnnit − Ê[ωτit|ωτi,t−1]
Here, the expectation operator is a third order polynomial of the past produc-
tivity at the quantile τ . This stage has many details that are based on the
preceding assumptions. First, given βn at each iteration, the corresponding
productivity is calculated by the second line of the above equation. Next, given
these values of productivity the functional expectation Ê[.|.] is constructed,
and then, the loss function is computed at this iteration. An alternative pro-
cedure is to relax the independent assumption of the different quantiles and to
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allow for a cross-sectional relationship between productivities. This assump-
tion is more realistic than my original assumption; however, it is not likely
essential for addressing the size effects in scale economies. Moreover, the in-
troduction of a cross correlation between the quantile productivities would
greatly increase the computational burden because all quantile βτn must be
estimated at the same time. Furthermore, a panel quantile method must be
used to produce a quantile operator Q̂τ [ωit|{ωsi,t−1}1s=0] instead of a simple ex-
pectation. The comparison between these two assumption is beyond the scope
of this paper.
1.7 Quantile Estimation Results
This section presents the results of the quantile OLS and the quantile
proxy method developed in the last section using the same banking data as
section 1.3. Table 1.9 shows the coefficients of a quantile regression of output
on inputs in which the results are based on the assumption that the inputs are
not correlated with the error term. Interestingly, this picture demonstrates
that there is no evidence of significant cross sectional variation in the scale
economies. In addition, the OLS coefficients reported in the last column of
the table lie around the result of the 90th quantile. This is not surprising when
the top 10 % of bank controls over 85% of total banking activities, ordinary
regression puts more weight on large banks, which may bias our conclusion for
other banks.
Moreover, the OLS approach, both ordinary and quantile method, ob-
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Table 1.9: Quantile Banking Production Function.
τ = 0.01 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.99 0.995 OLS
labor -0.013 -0.002 0.013 0.022 0.033 0.045 0.060 0.110 0.120 0.123 0.157
( 0.002 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) (0.001) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.048 ) (0.002)
check. dep. 0.221 0.210 0.193 0.183 0.172 0.158 0.139 0.068 0.015 0.002 0.080
(0.001 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001) ( 0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.002 ) ( 0.010) ( 0.022 ) (0.001)
Non-trans. dep. 0.682 0.659 0.645 0.635 0.620 0.598 0.565 0.380 0.085 0.058 0.352
(0.003 ) (0.000) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.006) ( 0.017 ) ( 0.017 ) (0.003)
capital 0.119 0.141 0.165 0.179 0.200 0.228 0.268 0.485 0.822 0.850 0.457
( 0.003 ) ( 0.000) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.006 ) ( 0.022 ) (0.032 ) (0.003)
scale 1.009 1.007 1.015 1.020 1.025 1.029 1.033 1.044 1.042 1.033 1.046
(0.000) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) (0.000 ) ( 0.000) ( 0.001) ( 0.006 ) (0.022) (0.002)
Data from Call Report 1993-2007, Quarterly Data, Method is Quantile Least Square Method
tains a refutable prediction for the input shares. For instance, the OLS indi-
cates that the non-transactional deposit contributes about 60% of the small
banks production, while this share is decreased for very large banks . This
definition is in contrast to the picture of table 1.8 that the share of the non-
transactional deposit in the total bank’s liability is increasing by size or at
least remains constant. Besides, table 1.8 shows that the share of capital in
the production is decreasing as banks become larger. However, the growing
impact of capital predicted by the OLS accords well with the theory that
large banks employ capital more effectively to fulfil reserve requirements and
to develop their hierarchical organizations.
In contrast to the quantile OLS, the results of the quantile proxy
method are quite different from those of the previous regressions. As shown
in table 1.10, the quantile proxy regression reveals that the scale economies
are about flat for a substantial portion of the industry but for very large
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Table 1.10: Banking Production Function (Proxy Method)
τ = 0.01 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.99 0.995 QP
labor -0.019 -0.008 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.024 0.034 0.063 0.084 0.087 0.085
( 0.002 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.012 ) (0.002)
check. dep. 0.223 0.217 0.207 0.201 0.194 0.184 0.170 0.117 0.056 0.046 0.109
( 0.001 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.009 ) (0.005)
Non-trans. dep. 0.345 0.326 0.315 0.304 0.301 0.298 0.294 0.279 0.407 0.521 0.422
( 0.003 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.196 ) ( 0.190 ) (0.017)
capital 0.121 0.136 0.149 0.158 0.170 0.188 0.214 0.336 0.559 0.627 0.328
( 0.003 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.021 ) (0.003)
scale 0.670 0.671 0.673 0.672 0.681 0.694 0.713 0.794 1.106 1.281 0.946
( 0.005 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.195 ) ( 0.189) (0.019)
Banking Production function using Quantile Proxy Method. The proxy variable is “Recov-
ery Rates”, Data from Call Report 1993-2007.
banks. Middle size institutions have the largest diseconomy of scale, while the
top 5% (about top 400 banks) experience somewhat an extensive economy of
scale. Importantly, this result sheds light on the fact why many mergers occur
among large banks: large parties involved in a consolidation benefit from both
productivity improvements and scale economies. In addition, this implies that
in the long run due to frequent mega-mergers, the industry will consist of a
limited number of very large banks and many tiny banks, which is consistent
with the trend in the last two decades. The consequence of this trend and
dynamics of mergers are left for future research.
Interestingly, the shares of capital and labor in production increase
with size, whereas the share of checkable deposit fades away. As I explained
before, small and medium bank use their capital to issue loans, but large
banks employ capital to construct their financial institutions and make a solid
reputation for building up deposits. Because capital is utilized more effectively
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in large banks, its contribution grows as banks get larger.
Moreover, based on this estimation the Labor share in the production
is rising by size. My conjecture is that because on average the size of loans
are greater for big banks, and these loans are issued for large productive firms,
hence the service of labor is more valuable compared to small banks. This
explanation is consistent with the fact that the top banks recruit talent and
pay higher wages. Furthermore, the relationship between borrowers and large
banks, in contrast to small financial institutions, is vastly impersonal and
formed on hard information. This allows them employ more labor in their
production.
Finally, table 1.10 shows that the share of checkable deposit fades away
as banks get larger. In other words, the ratio of checkable deposit on non-
transactional deposit approaches to zero. Despite this structural shift, inter-
estingly, the sum of their coefficients is constantly around 0.5, which means
that these two types of deposits are well substitutable. Indeed, as argued be-
fore, non-transactional deposit contains many different types of accounts with
various characteristics. The question of the role of each type account is beyond
the scope of this paper and left for future research.
My finding coincides with conclusions drawn by [16]. They estimate a
most preferred utility function for managers, in contrast to the conventional
cost function estimation. Significantly, they document solid evidence for scale
economies of very large banks. Nevertheless, their paper differs in two crucial
respects with this study: the methodology and the generality of results. In
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Figure 1.6: Banking Scale Economies
Scale economies for all quantiles with different proxies and for years before and after 2001
particular, they cannot find any evidence for scale economies for the pre 2001
banking data. To compare my method with theirs, I use their sample and
divide observations to two groups: post and pre 2001. Next, I apply my
method to the both time periods and draw the economy of scale for all quantiles
at figure 1.6.
Interestingly, the estimation for both periods shows extensive scale
economies for a few large banks. Although for the pre 2001 sample the stan-
dard error is larger than post 2001 result. This may stem from many financial
innovations or policy deregulations in 1990’s including: the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999. In short, the former permits acquisition and merger from
other states and the latter repeals last vestiges of the Glass Steagall Act of
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1933 and allows banks to engage in underwriting and selling insurance and
securities. The large standard error likely prevents Hughes-Mester from come
up with any scale economies for the pre 2001 sample
1.8 Conclusion
This paper estimates production functions to study scale economies
and productivity in banking. Compared to the cost function method, the
advantage of the production function estimation is to control for unobserved
variables. Ignoring the endogeneity of unobserved variables can potentially
lead to biased estimates. Another advantage is mainly data-driven. The cost
function method relies on measures of prices that are generally unreliable. In
contrast, the production function method uses input-level data.
I estimate production functions using two approaches. The first method
assumes unobserved variables are orthogonal to input levels and employs a
standard OLS regression to estimate production functions. The second ap-
proach allows for potential correlation between input levels and unobserved
bank-specific productivity shocks. [29] introduce a proxy method to control
for this correlation and show that OLS regression results are biased. I adopt
their method in banking by introducing three new proxy equations: recovery
rates of non-performing loans, charge off rates, and cash holdings of banks.
The OLS approach shows scale economies in banking. In contrast, the
proxy method illustrates diseconomies of scale, which documents that OLS
estimates are biased. Moreover, the proxy model rules out scale economies as
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a key explanation for bank mergers; however it provides evidence that merging
parties benefit from the productivity growth and improvements in efficiency.
The data also support the view that merging parties benefit from efficiency.
After mergers, banks experience rapid asset growth and higher income per
asset.
Although, the proxy model solves the simultaneity problem, it assumes
that the correlation between input levels and unobserved productivity shocks
is identical for different sizes. In banking, this assumption is not valid, be-
cause large banks use different technologies compared to small banks. In other
words, this assumption may potentially produce biased results for very large
banks. To solve this problem, I develop a quantile proxy method that can esti-
mate a size-dependent production function. The results of the quantile proxy
approach show that very large banks operate with extensive scale economies.
Interestingly, this result sheds light on the fact why many mergers occur among
large banks: mega-merger parties benefit from both improvements in produc-
tivity and scale economies.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycle Accounting in a Small Open
Economy 1
2.1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in applying the business cycle method-
ology of [7] (henceforth CKM) to study macroeconomic fluctuations in emerg-
ing economies ([37], [14], [21]). Emerging markets are of particular interest for
researchers, because their business cycles are qualitatively different from those
in the developed countries. In particular, in emerging economies the volatility
of consumption is greater than the volatility of output and trade balance is
strongly counter-cyclical. A natural framework to study fluctuations in emerg-
ing markets is a Small Open Economy.
Two important macroeconomic variables in an open economy are trade
balance and current account. They are often at the center of interest in emerg-
ing markets due to the frequent phenomena of sudden stops (reversals in trade
balance that often occur in recessions). The original CKM method is by con-
struction silent about the sources of movements in trade balance, because this
1This chapter is an essay that was co-authored by Mohammad Hossein Rahmati and
Jacek Rothert, the portion of the chapter written by the author of this dissertation is
computational results
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variable is sucked into the government consumption wedge.
In this paper we extend the CKM framework to a small open economy
by isolating additional two wedges: (i) a trend shock wedge and (ii) a debt
price wedge. We apply this methodology to shed some light on the question
about the sources of fluctuations in emerging markets. Wedges are residuals
of equilibrium conditions in a competitive market when data are fed into these
equations. In other words, wedges that look like time-varying taxes and pro-
ductivities are distorting the economy, which may have equivalent implications
as frictions in a detailed economy. We look at the contribution of different
wedges to the movements of different macroeconomic aggregates during the
1994 Tequila Crisis in Mexico.
In particular, our methodology allows us to evaluate relative impor-
tance of trend shocks and country risk shocks for the behavior of the business
cycles in emerging markets. In two recent studies, [6] and [10] presented small
open economy models encompassing the trend shock model of [1] and the
country risk model of [26] and [42]—two theories of emerging markets busi-
ness cycles that attracted most attention in the literature. They used Bayesian
methods to estimate variances of trend shocks and country risk shocks. Both
studies found that the posterior distributions of the two variances suggested
that trend shocks played minor role in the fluctuations in emerging markets
(Mexico in the first study and Argentina in the second), while the role of the
country risk shocks was substantial. We view our work as complementary -
we address the same question but with a different methodology.
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First, we do the full accounting exercise. In order to do it, we use more
data. In addition to the consumption, investment, output and trade balance
data, we use data on hours worked and current account. We show that the
discrepancy between net exports and current account provides information
about the interest rate wedge. Using series on hours worked is also very infor-
mative, as this variable behaves quite differently in emerging and in developed
economies. The correlation of hours worked with output is about 0.85 (s.e.
0.05) in developed countries and only 0.6 (s.e 0.12) in emerging markets (see
[26]).
Second, we show how different wedges are mapped to detailed small
open economies. In particular, we show that allocations in a prototype econ-
omy with interest and labor wedge, are identical to the allocations in a detailed
economy with exogenous shocks to the world interest rate coupled with a work-
ing capital constraint (as in [26] or [42]). This suggests that if the dynamic
behavior of an economy we study is well captured by models relying on interest
rate shocks and internal frictions, than in our accounting exercise we should
attribute large role to labor and interest rate wedge. The movements in these
two wedges should also be highly correlated.
We also show that allocations in a small open economy with trend
shocks (as in [1]) are, up to a first-order approximation, identical to allocations
in a small open economy version of [2] with exogenous terms of trade shocks,
if the latter are random walks. The intuition for this result is very simple.
If terms of trade are random walks, then a shock to terms of trade has a
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permanent effect. The main difference between trend shocks and stationary
productivity shocks is precisely that the former have permanent effects. To
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to give a formal structural
interpretation of the stochastic trend. We provide evidence, that in some
emerging economies terms of trade are indeed well approximated by random
walks.
We are not the first to add additional wedges to the original business
cycle accounting of CKM. [40] adds an asset market and a monetary policy
wedge to study the relationship between output fluctuations and inflation in
the US economy. [21] and [14] introduced a bond wedge to study the role of
external shocks in emerging markets. Our paper is the first to introduce a
wedge that is a manifestation of non-stationary shocks—a trend shock wedge.
2.2 Prototype Economy with Wedges
2.2.1 What is a wedge?
First we will give a brief explanation of what a wedge is. Consider
the following first order condition describing a consumption leisure trade-off
in a model with Cobb-Douglas preferences—u(c, ) = cη(1− )1−η—and Cobb-






In general, if we take macroeconomic data on consumption, hours worked and







= (1− τt)(1− α)Y datat /datat ,
i.e. such that the equilibrium conditions of the model are satisfied in the
data. An economic interpretation of the labor wedge is that it captures the
discrepancy between the stand-in household’s marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, and the marginal product of labor. While
the labor wedges is a reduced form concept, it may arise endogenously in a
different model of a more detailed economy. For example, [7] show that the
equilibrium allocations and prices in the sticky wage economy are the same as
those in a prototype economy with labor wedges. Although, their prototype
economy is base on a closed economy, but this conclusion can be generalized
to our prototype framework, as well.
2.2.2 The prototype economy
We will now describe our prototype economy with wedges. It is a small
open economy version of a standard real business cycle model of [20]. Each
period, the economy experiences an exogenous shock to the state of the world
st. The history of the shocks up to and including time t is s
t := (s0, s1, ..., st).
Technology
















where log γt will be interpreted as a trend shock wedge and logAt is the original
efficiency wedge, as in CKM. The specification of the final output is identical






























−1 ≤ 0 (2.2.2)
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where γ̄ is the growth rate of the economy along the balanced growth path. The
log of the price of debt—log qt—will be interpreted as the debt price wedge.
(2.2.1) is the stand-in household’s budget constraint. The last term on the
RHS of (2.2.1) represents the cost of debt holding and is introduced to ensure
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that the law of motion for debt in a linearized version of this economy is
stationary2. This term states that there is a cost associated with holding assets
in quantities that are not equal to the long-run level. Here, the long run level
of the debt position is where the normalized debt equals d̄. In the literature,
this convex cost is also called portfolio adjustment cost. In that term, d̄
denotes a steady-state level of debt in a stationary version of the economy3.
The remaining terms in the budget constraint are consumption expenditures
Ct, purchases of investment (1 + τx,t)Xt, labor income (1 − τ,t)wtt, capital
income rtKt and lump-sum transfers from the government TRt. The term
τx,t is the investment wedge—any distortion that makes the relative price of
investment be different from 1. The term τ,t is the labor wedge—any distortion
that makes marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure be
different from marginal product of labor. Equation (2.2.2) rules out Ponzi
schemes and equation (2.2.3) governs the law of motion of capital stock. We
assume quadratic adjustment costs in capital accumulation.
For now, we will assume Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption
and leisure:
U(C, 1− ) = [C
η(1− )1−η]1−σ
1− σ
The subsequent versions of the paper will describe how our results change if
we assume quasi-linear preferences of [12].
2See [34] for the discussion of different ways to avoid the unit root in debt holdings.
3The value of d̄ is indeterminate in theory. In our exercise, we will estimate it.
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Here, we abstract from government bonds. [33] show that this model is unde-
termined when both private agents and government hold assets. They argue
that as long as the government and the private bond have the same price,
what matters is the consolidated net of all asset holdings.
Resource constraint and external sector







where logGt will be the government spending wedge. Using the government
and household’s budget constraint, we get that net exports are given by:
NXt(s
t) = Dt(s











The last term on the RHS of (2.2.4) follows from the portfolio adjustment





In our accounting exercise, the discrepancy between current account and net
exports will help us identify the debt price wedge log qt.
2.2.3 Stationary prototype economy
Because of the trend growth, some variables are non-stationary. Simi-




With the above definition, we can lay out a stationary version of our prototype
economy. To simplify the notation, we will omit the explicit dependence of
allocations and prices on the state of the economy. Household’s problem in a




















d̃t+1 ≤ d (2.2.7)
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c̃at = d̃t − γtd̃t+1 (2.2.14)
c̃t + x̃t + g̃t + ñxt = ỹt (2.2.15)










where β̂t := βγ
η(1−σ)−1
t . Equations (2.2.9) and (2.2.10) are the inter-
temporal Euler equations for capital stock and external debt respectively.
Equation (2.2.11) describes the trade-off between consumption and leisure,
(2.2.12) is the stationary version of production function, (2.2.13) shows the re-
lationship between net exports and changes in external debt, (2.2.14) defines
the current account, (2.2.15) is the resource constraint and (2.2.16) describes
the law of motion for the capital stock.
2.2.4 Wedges
Our exogenous wedges are: (i) efficiency wedge logAt, (ii) labor wedge
τ,t, (iii) investment wedge τx,t, (iv) government wedge log gt, (v) trend shock
wedge log γt and (vi) interest rate wedge log qt. The first four wedges are the
same as in CKM. One difference is in our interpretation of the government
wedge. In our specification it is now only the government spending wedge
(in CKM it also included fluctuations in net exports). The two wedges we
introduce are (v) and (vi) - the trend shock wedge and the country risk wedge.
2.3 The Accounting Procedure
Similarly to CKM, we assume that the mapping between the state of the
economy and the vector of wedges is one-to-one, i.e. st = (logAt, τ,t, τx,t, log gt,
log γt, log qt)
′. In other words, the wedges in period t can be employed to
uniquely uncover the state of economy or st. The business cycle accounting
procedure consists of 3 steps. In the first step we estimate the stochastic
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process governing the behavior the vector of wedges {st}. In the second step,
“knowing” the stochastic process for wedges, we identify the actual realizations
of wedges (i.e. the values that the vector st has in each period t) - we simply
solve for the values of the wedges, so that the model equilibrium conditions
hold exactly in the data. In the last step we evaluate the contribution of
different wedges to the fluctuations of different macroeconomic aggregates.
We will now briefly summarize each of these steps, with particular focus on
the identification of the trend shock wedge log γt and the debt price wedge
log qt
4.
Step 1: ML estimation
The first step is to estimate the stochastic process governing the be-
havior of wedges. Similarly to CKM, we assume the following law of motion
for the vector of wedges:
st = P0 + Pst−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σ), (2.3.1)
where st is a 6 × 1 vector of wedges, P0 := [log Ā, τ̄, τ̄x, log ḡ, log γ̄, log q̄]′ is
a 6 × 1 vector of steady state values of the wedges, P is a 6 × 6 matrix of
auto-correlation coefficients and Σ is a 6 × 6 variance-covariance matrix of
exogenous shocks. All the non-zero elements in P and in Σ as well as P0 need
to be estimated. The actual number of parameters to estimate will depend on
the restrictions we impose on P and Σ. In practice, since Σ is symmetric and
4The details of the whole procedure can be found in [7]
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positive semi-definite we will estimate the lower-triangular matrix Q satisfying
Σ = QQ′.5
State-Space Form
We solve our prototype economy by log-linearizing6 the decision rules
around the steady state and then find the law of motion for endogenous vari-
ables via the method of undetermined coefficients. We use Uhlig’s Toolkit7 for
the second step. We then use the linearized laws of motion and express the
dynamic system governing the economy in the state-space form:
Xt+1 = AXt +Bεt+1






















Matrices A and C depend on the parameters of our linearized laws of motion
for endogenous and exogenous variables, which in turn depend on P0 and P .
Matrix B depends on the variance covariance matrix Σ. We then estimate
parameters of A, B and C using maximum likelihood, where the likelihood
5Computationally, it is much easier to inverse a on-sided matrix than a full matrix.
6Except for the variables that can take on negative values. In that case we assume laws
of motion are approximately linear in levels rather than in logs.
7Available at http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpol/html/toolkit.htm
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function is calculated using the Kalman filter (see technical appendix in [7] for
details). One thing to point out is that we use change in net exports and cur-
rent account rather than levels. The reason is that for some parameter values,
these two variables become random walks and the likelihood is not informative.
[6] encounter a similar problem and deal with it in exactly the same manner.
Using first differences of net exports and current account requires that we use
lagged values of these variables in our state vector X.
Step 2: Identifying wedges
Having estimated the process for wedges we need to measure the wedges
in the data. Much of this procedure follows [7]. We first compute model deci-
sion rules, which are functions mapping the state of the economy to allocations.
In each period t the state of the economy is given by (st, k̃t, d̃t,Γt−1). Given
the estimated process for st, we obtain model’s decision rules of the form:
C(st, k̃t, d̃t,Γt−1), (st, k̃t, d̃t,Γt−1), etc. The wedges are chosen so that in each
period t we have C(st, k̃t, d̃t,Γt−1) = Cdatat , (st, k̃t, d̃t,Γt−1) = 
data
t and so on
8.
Labor wedge and government wedge are easy to measure. Government
wedge is taken directly from the data on government spending. Labor wedge
can be obtained from (2.2.11). Identification of the remaining four wedges is
more complicated. In order to identify them we need to solve, for each period,
the system of 4 equations - (2.2.9), (2.2.10), (2.2.12) and an equation that
8In practice, our state vector also contains the lagged values of the ratios of net exports
and current account to output, because we use change in net exports and change in current
account rather than levels.
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links net exports with the current account. We obtain the last equation by
combining (2.2.13) and (2.2.14) (intuitively, we use the difference between net
exports and current account to identify the debt price wedge). We need to
make some assumption regarding initial condition for Γ0. We assume that
initially the de-trended GDP is in its non-stochastic steady state. Then we
may obtain the value of Γ0 by dividing actual value from the data by the de-
trended model’s steady state. Then, we will know the value of c̃1, k̃1 and d̃1
9.
Then, the four unknowns are log γ1, τx,1, q1 and logA1 which can be solved
for. Knowing log γ1 we calculate Γ1 and can find log γ2, τx,2, qt and logA2,
and so on. The two equations to identify the trend shock wedge are (2.2.10)
and (2.2.12). The identifying moment is the response of today’s consumption
relative to output - trend shock raises permanent income, and so consumption
response is stronger. As in [1] this is simply an exploitation of the permanent
income hypothesis.
Step 3: Accounting
Our accounting procedure at the conceptual level is the same as in [7].
The output of Step 2 was the series of the estimated realizations of wedges—
{ŝt}Tt=1. In Step 3 we evaluate the contribution of each wedge to the movements
in macro aggregates. We do it by feeding in one wedge at a time, or in
9Assuming that it is the GDP that is in its steady state value in period 1 is arbitrary.
Alternatively we could assume the same thing about investment or consumption. Our
results will probably differ somewhat. As a robustness check we will redo our exercise using
alternative identification of initial value for Γ0.
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combinations. E.g., to evaluate the contribution of the trend shock wedge
alone to fluctuations during the whole sample, for each t we set logAt = log Ā,
τ,t = τ̄, τx,t = τ̄x, log gt = log ḡ, log qt = log q̄ and for the trend shock
wedges we set log γt = log γ̂t, i.e. the estimated realization of the trend shocks
wedge. We then feed in such modified series of st into the model, compute the
allocations using model’s decisions rules and compare them with the data.
2.4 Estimation and Accounting Results
We applied our methodology to Mexican data, covering the time period
1986-2010. We used quarterly data, which gave us 89 observations total. At
this stage our results are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution.
In particular, we used linear decision rules to estimate the process for wedges
and to measure the actual realizations of wedges. Over the time period 1986-
2010, Mexico has experienced substantial fluctuations, resembling more those
of the US Great Depression rather than typical US post-war business cycle. For
this reason, linear approximation might not be accurate enough - it is likely
Mexico experienced shocks that took it far away from the balanced growth
path. The subsequent versions of the paper will include results with decision
rules calculated using second order approximation and with finite element
method10.
10See [35] and [24]
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2.4.1 Process for Wedges
The stochastic process for wedges was assumed to be a 1-st order VAR:
st = P0 + Pst−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σ) (2.4.1)
Because of the short time period, large overall fluctuations in Mexico and the
fact that we are estimating all entries in matrices P and Σ11, our estimates
of the stochastic process for wedges are quite imprecise. In particular, the
standard errors on the coefficients associated with the trend shocks wedge
are quite large, so we treat our preliminary results with caution. Table 2.1
presents our estimate of matrix P and Table 2.2 presents our estimate of the
lower-triangular matrix Q implying the variance-covariance matrix Σ = QQ′.
Table 2.1: Estimates of the matrix P
logA 1.002 -0.134 0.000 -0.001 -0.456 0.082
(0.190) (0.741) (0.163) (0.057) (16.563) (2.052)
τ -0.017 0.500 -0.086 -0.002 7.442 -0.076
(0.640) (0.409) (0.196) (0.109) (15.851) (6.927)
τx -0.061 0.040 0.991 -0.008 0.480 -0.413
(0.307) (0.602) (0.122) (0.095) (12.200) (5.211)
log g 0.343 -0.665 -0.164 0.804 15.256 3.633
(1.437) (2.972) (0.832) (0.424) (92.942) (14.483)
log γ 0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.781 -0.016
(0.009) (0.039) (0.004) (0.002) (0.516) (0.150)
log q 0.003 0.020 0.001 -0.001 0.062 0.958
(0.016) (0.038) (0.014) (0.005) (1.566) (0.287)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
11We did not impose any restrictions on these two matrices except for those ensuring that
P is stationary and Σ is positive semi-definite.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of the matrix Q
logA 0.0208 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0054)
τ 0.0053 0.0147 0 0 0 0
(0.0055) (0.0034)
τx 0.0015 -0.1147 0.0464 0 0 0
(0.1850) (0.2428) (0.1076)
log g 0.0075 0.0179 0.0011 0.0536 0 0
(0.0373) (0.0202) (0.1069) (0.0122)
log γ 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003)
log q -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0011)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Having estimate the stochastic process governing the wedges and the
expectations of agents in our prototype economy, we can measure the wedges.
The two wedges we are interested in are the trend shock wedge log γt and the
debt price wedge log qt. Our estimated series of the two wedges are presented
in Figure 2.1. The blue line plots the estimated series for the trend shock
wedge and green line plots the series for the debt price wedge. Notice the
sharp decline in the trend shock wedge around the Tequila Crisis in 1994.
A somewhat surprising result is the estimate of the series for debt price
wedge. We expected to notice a substantial drop around the Tequila Crisis,
reflecting a sharp increase in the country risk. Our identification of the debt
price relied on the discrepancy between net exports and current account. In
our specification, part of that discrepancy followed from the quadratic portfolio
adjustment cost. This suggest that (i) (ii) the value of the parameter ψ and
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Figure 2.1: Estimated series for log γt and log qt.










(ii) the form of ensuring stationarity may affect our estimates of the debt
price wedge. We have not yet evaluated the robustness of our finding to those
alternative specifications.
2.4.2 Accounting for the Tequila Crisis
Before we do the accounting exercise we compare the original data with
the series generated by the model where we feeded all the wedges with their
values estimated in the second step of our procedure, and in which agents
“know” the stochastic process for wedges is (2.4.1). Given the fact that fluc-
tuations are substantial and that we only use 1st order approximation in both
our estimation of (2.4.1) and in the calculation of the wedges, we view the


















































































































































































































































































































































































Next we look at the Tequila Crisis. In this exercise we set all the wedges
but one to their steady state values. The remaining wedge is assumed to take
on the “actual” value as we have previously measured. We then feed in this
modified realization of the st process and compare the model predictions with
the data. For now, we only look at three macro aggregates: GDP, net exports
and current account.
Output Figure 2.3 plots the results of our benchmark accounting exercise
for real output in Mexico during the Tequila crisis. The blue line plots the
actual data. The other lines plot model predictions with one wedge “active” at
a time. The efficiency wedge is able to account for almost all the movements
in real output—the green line corresponds to the model prediction where only
the measured realizations of the efficiency wedge is fed in, while all other
wedges are at their steady state values. The correlation with real output is
remarkable.
External sector Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot the results of the benchmark ac-
counting exercise for net exports and current account. Both figures show
that the movements in the trend shock wedge alone can account for most of
the fluctuations in net exports and the current account. Movements in other
wedges (in isolation) predict an earlier sudden stop and do not generate the
subsequent decline in net exports and current account in the late 1990s. These
results suggest that movements in these two variables are driven primarily by
non-stationary shocks (e.g. to permanent income).
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Figure 2.3: Mexican GDP during the Tequila Crisis.

















Data and model predictions for each wedge (one at a time).
2.4.3 Contribution of wedges to fluctuations during the whole sam-
ple
We also look at the contribution of different wedges to macroeconomic
fluctuations during the whole sample - 1986-2010. Table 2.3 presents corre-
lations between the data and the model simulate series with only one wedge
fed in at a time. The statistics from that table confirm the results from our
accounting for the Tequila Crisis. Correlations of the series for net exports
and current account generated by only the trend shock movements are highly
correlated with actual data. The correlation for the series of current account
is particularly high—0.95. Overall, our results suggest that understanding
non-stationary shocks is important for our understanding of movements in net
66
Figure 2.4: Mexican net exports during the Tequila Crisis.
















Data and model predictions for each wedge (one at a time).
exports and current account.12
2.5 Equivalence Results
At the measurement level, a wedge is a discrepancy between the fric-
tionless model’s equilibrium conditions and their data counterparts (i.e. it is
simply a number). It is quite meaningless, unless we can give it an economic
interpretation. Typically, more than one interpretation is possible. For exam-
12One concern is that the underlying parameters of this experiment are stochastic vari-
ables. The reason is that the parameters A,B, and C are non-linear functions of estimated
steady state levels. Therefore, an alternative test is to compute the contribution of wedges
for different steady state levels and then take its weighted expectation. We leave this sug-
gestion for future research, in particular, we aim to introduce this idea into [7]
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Figure 2.5: Mexican current account during the Tequila Crisis.



















Data and model predictions for each wedge (one at a time).
ple, a labor wedge is a manifestation of a friction that distorts the equality
between marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and
the marginal product of labor. That friction may be a simple tax on labor
earnings, from which government expenditures and transfers are financed. It
may also be a government policy which restricts competition in the labor mar-
ket as described e.g. in [8].
We introduced additional two wedges to the original CKM method.13
13[7] provide the equivalence theorems for four wedges used in their paper (i.e. efficiency
wedge, labor wedge, investment wedge, and government wedge). For example, they show
that a sticky wedge economy has the same allocations and prices as the prototype economy
with labor wedges. Similarly, they illustrate that financial frictions in inputs may manifest
themselves as efficiency wedges. Moreover, credit market frictions can be equivalent to
investment wedges. All their equivalence results and subsequent proofs are also valid with
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Table 2.3: Correlation of simulated series with the data
Wedge Y NX / Y CA / Y
Efficiency 0.91 -0.08 -0.37
Labor -0.14 -0.15 -0.21
Investment 0.03 -0.81 -0.61
Government 0.15 -0.63 -0.41
Trend 0.03 0.74 0.95
Debt price -0.58 0.55 -0.35
All wedges set constant except one. Output is de-trended with a linear
trend.
In this section we would like to give each of them a possible interpretation.
First, we will show that allocations in a detailed small open economy with
exogenous terms of trade shocks are, up to a first-order approximation, iden-
tical to those in the prototype economy outlined in Section 2.2, under an
assumption that terms of trade are random walks. Second, we will show that
a detailed economy of [26] with independent country risk and working capital
constraint is equivalent to our prototype economy with debt price (almost by
construction) and labor wedges.
2.5.1 A Detailed Economy with Terms of Trade Shocks
The intuition for our first equivalence result is very simple. If terms of
trade are random walks, then a shock to terms of trade has a permanent effect,
just like the trend shock of [1]. We will abstract from all other wedges, except
respect to the small open economy prototype. Therefore, in this section we only focused on
the new wedges introduced in this paper.
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for a temporary productivity shock. We will also assume away the capital
adjustment and debt holding costs. This is done for simplicity and does not
alter our results.
Consider the following small open economy version of [2]. The economy
produces two types of goods. An intermediate good a is produced by inter-
mediate firms (i-firms) using a Cobb-Douglas technology with inputs being
capital and labor. The production function for the i-firms is:





where Ãt is the stationary technology shock. The final consumption / in-
vestment good is produced using the domestic intermediate a and a foreign
intermediate b. The two goods are combined according the following constant
elasticity of substitution function:
G(a, b) = aωb1−ω (2.5.1)
The price of the imported good b is normalized to 1. The price of the country’s
export good a is denoted with qa. The price of the final good is denoted with
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We assume that the economy is small, and that the price of good a
exogenously fluctuates in the world market. E.g., in case of Venezuela or
Russia, one can interpret a as being oil. We assume that qat follows a random
walk:
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With these definitions, we will show, that the allocations in the two economies














Hence, we will get:
qat Y
a
t = ptYt (2.5.4)
where Yt is GDP in economy outlined in Section 2.2.











We de-trend our detailed economy in the same way as we de-trended






The budget constraint for the representative household is now:
ptĉt + ptγtk̂t+1 ≤ qat Y at + (1− δ)ptk̂t + qtγtd̂t+1 − d̂t (2.5.5)







We will first divide both sides of (2.5.5) by pt. Given (2.5.4), we will
obtain:









1−α = rtk̂t + wtt, and we assumed away all other wedges and
capital adjustment costs, this equation looks the same as (2.2.6), except for
the terms denoting debt. However, the debt in (2.2.6) is specified in units of
domestic good. The debt in condition (2.5.6) above is in units of international
good. Dividing it by pt, converts it into units of today’s final good, just as in
(2.2.6). Hence, conditions (2.5.6) and (2.2.6) are identical (recall we assumed
away portfolio adjustment costs).






















= (1− α)k̂αt γ1−αt −αt (2.5.9)
The conditions characterizing the prototype economy with trend shock





1− δ + αAt+1k̃αt+1(γt+1t+1)1−α
}
(2.5.10)





= (1− α)k̃αt γ1−αt −αt (2.5.12)
Comparing these conditions we can see they are identical, except for (2.5.8)
and (2.5.11), which is why we can only talk about the equivalence in terms of













where Uc := ∂U/∂c and Ucc = ∂Uc/∂ log(c), Uc = ∂Uc/∂ log(), all of them
evaluated at the steady state. Under the assumption of a random walk for qat ,
the price of domestic consumption is also a random walk and hence Etp̂t+1 = p̂t.













which is identical to the log-linear approximation of (2.5.11).
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2.5.1.1 Are Terms of Trade Random Walks?
Our equivalence result assume that terms of trade were well approxi-
mated with a random walk process. We verified that in the data for a sample
of emerging economies this is indeed a case. We collected the data on terms
of trade for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Turkey (a sample of often
studied emerging economies). Figure 2.6 in the Appendix plots the series for
terms of trade for the 5 economies. For each of them performed Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests to establish whether the series contained a unit root. For
none of these countries could we reject the null of a unit root. Next, to make
sure the series are in fact random walks, we tested whether the series of first
differences are white noise. For three out of five countries—Korea, Mexico and
Turkey—we could not reject the null that the first differences of the terms of
trade are white noise. Hence, given the series do contain the unit root, the
terms of trade seem to be well approximated by a random walk. The results
of our tests are presented in Table 2.4.
The fact that only for three countries could we make an argument
for a random walk-like behavior of the terms of trade, only suggests that
our interpretation of trend shocks might not work for every single country.
We never hoped this would be the case. The fact that there are countries
for which this can be a plausible story is very encouraging and creates an
interesting avenue for further research.
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Figure 2.6: Terms of Trade in Emerging Economies
2.5.2 An Economy with Working Capital Constraint
In this section we will show how an economy with interest rate shocks
and working capital constraint described e.g. in [26] and [42] can be mapped
to our prototype economy with debt price and labor wedge. In models with
working capital friction, a fraction θ must be paid, before the production takes
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Table 2.4: Terms of Trade Random Walk Test
Unit root test White noise tests for 1st differences
MacKinnon Bartlett’s Portmanteau
Z-statistic p-value B-statistic p-value Q-statistic p-value
Argentina -1.999 0.287 1.905 0.001 65.443 0.000
Brazil -1.633 0.466 2.246 0.000 23.682 0.000
Korea 1.877 0.999 0.833 0.492 1.680 0.794
Mexico -0.565 0.879 0.471 0.980 2.250 0.690
Turkey 0.055 0.963 0.704 0.704 0.112 0.999
Testing for a random walk behavior of the terms of trade in emerging economies.
place. This implies firms at the beginning of time t must borrow funds to
finance part of their wage bill, at interest rate Rt−1. The profit maximization
problem for the firms is then:
maxAtF (kt, t)− wtt − rtkt − (Rt−1 − 1)θwtt
From the firm’s problem we get that the wage is given by:
wt =
1
1 + θ(Rt−1 − 1)AtF2(kt, t)





1 + θ(Rt−1 − 1)AtF2(kt, t)
The above condition is equivalent to (2.2.11) if we define the labor wedge to
be:
τ,t = 1− 1
1 + θ(Rt−1 − 1)
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With the labor wedge defined above, the detailed economy with working capital




which implies a tight link between the labor wedge and the debt price wedge:









We studied the fluctuations in a small open economy model using the
business cycle accounting methodology of [7]. In doing so, we extended the
original CKM method and identified fluctuations in two more wedges - debt
price wedge and trend shock wedge. Our results showed that movements in
the trend shock wedge alone can account for as much as 80-90% of fluctuations
in net exports and current account, during both the Tequila Crisis in Mexico
and during the 1980s recession in Canada.
Our results suggest that in order to understand movements in net ex-
ports and current account, we must understand the source of non-stationary
shocks. We provide one interpretation of such shocks for an open economy—
exogenous movements in the terms of trade, under the assumption that terms
of trade are random walks. This is of course only one possible interpretation
and in general we believe that our results call for a more satisfactory theory
of a stochastic trend.
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Chapter 3
Demand Estimation for the Iranian
Automobile Industry 1
Introduction
The Iranian auto market is supplied by two major companies, I.K.Co.
(Iran Khodro Company) and Saipa-Yadak, and other relatively small produc-
ers and importers. In particular, the two largest companies account for more
than 98% of the total market share, however, their products are often viewed
as low quality. Interestingly, these companies sell their products with rela-
tively high markups which is commonly observed in monopoly markets.2 To
explain these observations, this paper provides a simple theoretical framework
to present the conditions under which both firms choose to produce low quality
products with high prices.
Moreover, empirical estimations based on discrete choice models are
used to test theoretical results by estimating marginal costs and markups and
more importantly to conduct counterfactual experiments. Interestingly, the
1This chapter is an essay that was co-authored by Mohammad Hossein Rahmati and
Seyed Reza Yousefi, the portion of the chapter written by the author of this dissertation is
empirical results. An earlier version of this essay is to be published in [32]
2To put it concretely, markup rates of domestic cars are significantly higher than im-
ported cars
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results provide evidence for significant markups of domestic cars compared to
imported cars. Also, estimated marginal costs implied by the BLP method are
used in a counterfactual analysis to show that firms are reluctant to produce
higher quality goods, a claim supported by the simple theoretical framework, as
well. Moreover, by using these estimates of marginal costs, we show that firms
may produce hight quality cars by a reduction in tariff rates. These finding
are quite robust to alternative assumptions of market conduct. The critical
implication for policymakers is that a reduction in the tariff can potentially
increase welfare.
The estimations in this paper also investigated the market from other
perspectives. Using the Multinomial Logit model, effects of changes in the
attributes of people in the market were probed. The estimations suggested
that an increase in average income, a decrease in average family size of the
Iranian households and a decrease in the average population age will result in
higher annual sales. We discuss that these estimated marginal effects of the
changes in the attributes on demand could be advantageous for manufacturers.
They could be beneficial for policy making strategies especially in the cases of
changes in the Iranian social welfare and gradual changes in the Iranian family
attributes.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 3.1 provides a the-
oretical model to explain why firms are manufacturing lower quality products.
Section 3.2 explains the data used in empirical estimations. Empirical frame-
works, the basic Multinomial Logit model and the BLP method, are described
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in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 provides three sets of empirical results. First,
the results of estimations using the Multinomial Logit model are provided
to explore the characteristics of the market. Second, the results of the BLP
method illustrate the presence of higher markups for lower quality products in
the Iranian auto industry. And third, based on the estimated parameters of
the BLP model, a counterfactual analysis is performed to show that producing
lower quality products is the dominant strategy for both firms in the Iranian
auto market. Finaly, Section 3.5 concludes and outlines questions for future
research.
3.1 Theoretical Model
This section provides a theoretical framework to study the Iranian auto
market. A static game is used to obtain and to illustrate under what conditions
both firms in a duopoly market choose to produce low quality products rather
than highly differentiated cars. Based on the model, we conduct a simple
counterfactual empirical experiment in Section 3.4.3 to support the idea that
it is profitable for neither company to deviate to any other outcome or under
any conduct, either collusive or oligopolistic. To build a proper model to best
fit the Iranian auto market we need to make few of assumptions.
Assumption 1. The game consists of two stages. In the first period, each firm
chooses to produce either a high or a low quality product, and in stage two,
each firm strategically chooses the price to maximize its profit.
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Assumption 2. Firms may collude in prices given their production portfolios.3
4
The assumption states that after a firm chooses to produce a quality,
either low or high, it is possible to collude with the other firm on pricing with-
out breaking any laws. For simplicity, we assume that the firms choose to
produce either a low or a high quality rather than a quality from a continuous
state space. In addition, the assumption that firms can collude with no cost is
reasonable since there is no antitrust law in Iran, i.e., no question of legality
for colluding firms. Such a market leads to collusive equilibria in which firms
charge high prices that approach the monopoly markups. Additionally, em-
pirical estimates of markups in Section 3.4 verify that the companies exercise
high markups in the market.
In addition to the fact that firms charge high markups, the Iranian
auto market is widely known as a closed or a domestic market. In 2005, over
98% of the cars in the market were manufactured by domestic firms and less
than 2% of the cars were imported to Iran by foreign producers.5 As a result,
we claim that imported cars have almost no effect on the quality choice of
the major domestic producers, and for now we ignore their effects. Besides
3Appendix .1 provides a dynamic version of this quality-price game such that producers
have no incentive to deviate from the collusion strategy
4An alternative assumption is that firms collude in quality and compete for prices. This
framework leads to the high-low quality in the domestic production, which is not consistent
with reality. Moreover, looking at the history of these firms I.K.Co established about 20 years
earlier than Saipa and has manufactured about the same quality cars since its foundation.
5Any car assembled outside the country is called an imported car, otherwise they are
called domestic. Imported automobiles are distinguished by asterisks in Table 3.6.
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The matrix representation of the model, πlhl stands for the profit of a firm producing a low
quality product while its competitor produces a high quality good, i.e., profit of the low
quality producer in a high-low outcome.
these assumptions, lack of dynamic panel data prevents us from studying the
dynamic strategic behaviors of the firms. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to a
static framework.
As mentioned, our benchmark model consists of two periods. In period
one, the firms choose the quality of the product from a list of qualities, either
high or low, and pricing decisions are made in the second period. To find the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, assumption 2 suggests that the firms
choose to collude on pricing in the second period regardless of their quality
choice in the first period. We denote the qualities of the higher product and the
lower product by qh and ql, respectively, where qh > ql. Furthermore, the fixed
cost of producing a high quality product is ch which is greater than the corre-
sponding fixed cost of producing a low quality one denoted by cl. Our model
focuses on a vertical differentiation structure where the consumers’ choices
vary with their taste parameters. The taste parameter of the individuals are
assumed to be drawn independently from a uniform distribution with support
[θl, θh]. Consumers have utility function of the form u((p
i, qi), θ) = θqi− pi, as
in [41] where i ∈ {l, h}. Given these prices, it is straightforward to show that
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there exists a consumer with taste θ∗ = p
h−pl
qh−ql who is indifferent to consuming
the low or high quality product. In addition, we assume that an outside op-
tion yields zero utility for consumers. It is clear that the agents with tastes
lower than θ∗ =
pl
ql
never consume any product and end up with an outside
option and its zero utility. Obviously, for the existence of an equilibrium, it is
necessary that both θ∗ and θ∗ belong to [θl, θh]. In all, we can state that:
Lemma 1. When both high and low quality products are present in the market,
given prices pl and ph, customers with tastes belonging to [θ∗, θh] purchase the
high quality product, customers with tastes [θ∗, θ∗] purchase the low quality
product and all other consumers with tastes [θl, θ∗] don’t buy anything and end
up consuming an outside option and getting zero utility.
Lemma 2. When only one product quality is present in the market, i.e., both
firms produce the same quality good, given quality q and price p of the good,
customers with tastes [p
q
, θh] purchase the product and all other consumers
[θl, p
q
] don’t purchase anything and obtain zero utility as long as p
q
≥ θl.
The model has three potential types of equilibria in the pure action
space: both firms producing high quality goods, both firms producing low
quality goods and the case in which one firm produces a low quality good and
the other manufactures a high quality one. These three sets of strategy pairs
are denoted by high-high, low-low and high-low, respectively. The normal form
of the game is presented in Table 3.1 with profits of firms in the boxes for each
strategy pair. In Section 3.4, we provide empirical estimations of values of
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the profits in Table 3.1 corresponding to each strategy-pair. The estimates
suggest that the unique equilibrium is when both firms produce low quality
goods in the market. Indeed, the theoretical results should be in agreement
with the counterfactual experiments. Therefore, we provide conditions for the
structural parameters of the model and show that for a reasonable range of
parameters, both firms produce low quality goods and low-low is the only
static Nash-Equilibrium of the model. To do so, we show that for all strategy
pairs other than low-low, there is at least one firm with a profitable deviation
from the according action/quality choice; producing a high quality product is
always a strictly dominated action in our model. In other words, when firms
produce different qualities, it is profitable for the high quality manufacturer to
deviate and produce the lower quality good. Similarly, when both companies
produce high quality goods, deviation to produce a low quality good is a
profitable strategy. In all, we conclude that the only sustainable equilibrium
is low-low.6 The very first step to support the idea of the unique equilibrium
is to characterize the corresponding profit of each outcome, and to obtain
conditions and suitable ranges for the parameters.
First, we characterize equilibrium prices and the corresponding profits
in the market when one firm produces a high quality product and the other
manufactures a low quality one. As mentioned earlier, all consumers with
taste θ ≥ θ∗ choose the high quality product, resulting in a profit equal to
6To put it more concretely, the domestic firms produce low quality cars and forgo high
quality markets for importers who face an extensive tariff rate
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πhhl = (θ
h − θ∗)(ph − ch) for the high quality good producer. On the other
hand, all consumers belonging to θ∗ > θ ≥ θ∗ choose to consume low quality
goods and the profit πlhl = (θ
∗ − θ∗)(pl − cl) is obtained by the low quality
good producer. Based on Assumtpion 2, ph and pl are chosen to maximize







7 However, note that
πhhl is obtained by the high quality manufacturer and π
l
hl is the profit of the low
quality good producer.8 According to [22], cost functions should be convex in
qualities in this framework. Hence, for simplicity we assume ci = qi
2
where









Note that, as mentioned, for the existence of equilibrium, we should
have θl ≤ θhl∗ and θ∗hl ≤ θh. Using equation 3.1.1, the latter is satisfied if
we have qh + ql ≤ θh. This result is intuitive and comes from the consumers’
optimal choice and the convexity of the cost functions when both qualities
are present. The inequality implies that for any given level of lesser product
quality, there is an upper limit for quality of the superior good. For example,
7The side payment is not allowed in Iran; however, the firms implicitly collude on geo-
graphical locations in where they open exclusive retailers. Moreover, they collude on what
products they produce. For instance, both companies recently lunch the same car, called
Tondar, which is supposed to be a substitute for their most popular product. By this means
the firms can reduce the industry competition. In facts, the government officially prohibits
any side payment in the production of Tondar and regulates the input prices extensively.
8We implicitly assume that each firm reaps her return from selling her cars, i.e. collusion
gains are not divided
86
if the higher quality, qh, is too high, then no one will buy the product and the
high quality producer must exit the market. Finally, when the optimal choices









Likewise, one can easily derive the profit for the two other equilibria.
For example, in the case in which both firms produce low quality products,
only the consumers with tastes higher than p
l
ql
will buy the good and other
consumers will not purchase anything. One can easily consider the calculated
mass of consumers as the demand function, plug it into the profit function,






Similarly, when both companies produce the higher quality product the





It is worth mentioning that Assumption 2 plays a significant role in
our conclusions. Notice that when both firms produce the same good, in a
competitive market with no collusion, their profits will be zero. Interestingly,
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in our empirical estimations, the null hypothesis that the Iranian auto man-
ufacturers are colluding is not rejected. Therefore, we claim that collusion is
an acceptable assumption in such an environment with no antitrust laws.
Lemma 3. Producing the higher qualiy product is strictly dominated by the
production of the lower quality good if:
θh < 2ql + qh <
2qh
2
+ qhql − ql2 +
√
2qlqh3 − qh2ql2
2qh − ql (3.1.5)
Proof. To complete the proof, after finding the profit functions by equations
3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, one can find conditions under which both inequalities, πlll ≥
πhhl and π
l
hl ≥ πhhh are satisfied. To do so, we define Θ1 = {θh : πlll ≥ πhhl} and
Θ2 = {θh : πlhl ≥ πhhh} that satisfy the inequalities, respectively.9 The sets Θ1
and Θ2 can be represented by the following equations:










One can show that Θ1 ∈ Θ2 with some algebra; if θh is included in Θ1, both
conditions are satisfied. Using the following inequality we get the lemma’s
results:
θh < 2ql + qh <
2qh
2
+ qhql − ql2 +
√
2qlqh3 − qh2ql2
2qh − ql (3.1.7)
9Since we are looking for the symmetric equilibrium and firms are similar, the profits
corresponding to the high-low and low-high outcomes will be the same.
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The lemma implies that the θh should be bounded above (equation
3.1.5). This condition is intuitive in the sense that if the market consists of
very high taste consumers, then, producing high quality product should be
profitable and the market will not end up with a low-low equilibrium. There-
fore, the lemma indicates that for restricted parameter values, the duopolist
firms in the Iranian automobile market produce lower quality products rather
than highly differentiated goods.
Empirical Method
Based on the theory section, we propose the following approach to
test empirically whether the low quality production is the dominant strategy.
Indeed, the real economy is more complicated than a two-goods environment
as presented in this section, and it may best be described by a differentiated
Bertrand competition. Therefore, the above discussion can be generalized to a
more complicated model. Assume that the firm 1 is producing J1 products and
the set of its outputs is defined as {1, · · · J1} ≡ 	1. This set can be either a high
quality 	h or a low attribute 	l. In general, her total profit from producing
this portfolio is Π1(P1;P2,Γ1,Γ2) =
∑
j∈	1 πj(pj;P1, P2,Γ1,Γ2) where Pi is the
price set of the cars produced by the firm i, and Γi is its set of characteristics
including consumer tastes and marginal costs.
Similar to the Lemma 3, to evaluate conditions under which the low
quality choice is a dominant strategy, the profits must be computed for all
possible quality alternatives. In the same way, it is assumed that the firms
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optimize their joint profit. Therefore, their profit, for instance, when firms are
producing high and low are:
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ) = argmaxP1,P2 Π1(P1;P2,Γ1 = 	H ,Γ2 = 	L)










2 ,Γ1 = 	L,Γ2 = 	H)
Where 	H and 	l are sets of high and low quality cars. Likewise, other
profits that are introduced in Table 3.1 can be computed. Nevertheless, these
amounts depend on the values of Γ. Therefore, before conducting any coun-
terfactuals, section 3.4.2 estimates demand and supply parameters, including
marginal costs and consumer’s tastes. The discrete choice techniques are used
to estimate the demand function. Estimating the marginal costs requires ad-
ditional information from the manufacturers. Since this data are not available,
the following J1 + J2 first order equations can be used to derive the J1 + J2
marginal costs:
∂Π1(P1;P2,Γ1 = 	H ,Γ2 = 	L)
∂pj
+
∂Π2(P2;P1,Γ1 = 	H ,Γ2 = 	L)
∂pj
= 0
Importantly, estimating Γ parameters requires additional assumptions
on the market conduct. The basic structure presumed in the paper is that firms
jointly maximize their profits; however, for robustness check other conducts
are also analyzed. For this purpose, appendix .2 replicates the counterfactual
experiments when imposing different market structures on the estimation of
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Γ parameters. One final remark is that we use the above equation in section
3.3.2 and derive its first order condition in equation 3.3.9.
3.2 Data
The Iranian automobile industry is primarily composed of domestic
cars produced by two major manufacturers, Iran-Khodro Co. and Saipa Yadak
Co.,10 in addition to a number of limited imported cars.
Three datasets are used for the demand side which contain rich individual-
level information. These micro-level observations are used to link the datasets
to each other. The first dataset, gathered by the authors, contains character-
istics of all cars in the market - including displacement, weight, length, width,
etc. The authors have used the producers’ websites to collect the necessary
information on the products characteristics. The second dataset is the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CES) which is published annually by the Iranian
Statistical Center. The CES dataset for 2005 contains more than 100,000 ob-
servations for the most recent 12-month period expenditures of households:
specific characteristics of individuals, including family-size, education, sex,
age, marital status and occupation as well as specific details about household
expenditures. A valuable feature of the CES dataset is that it reports the
expenditure of households on durable goods, such as cars. We have used this
crucial feature to merge our datasets. Summary statistics of these two datasets
10Pars Khodro Company is also another major producer of domestic cars which was
purchased by Saipa Yadak Co. in 2000.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean STD
Automobiles
Length (mm) 4368.29 461.09
Width (mm) 1707.71 110.80
Displacement (cm3) 1893.00 628.42
Number of Cylinders 4.24 0.71
Automatic Transmission 0.07 0.24
*Power Steering 0.89 0.31
*Air conditioning 0.92 0.27
Price (000’$) 18.52 13.21
Weight (kg) 1256.00 366.22
*Air bag 0.32 0.47
*ABS Braking 0.42 0.50
Number of Observations: 38
Individuals
Sex 0.28 0.45
Family Size 3.86 1.94
Age 43.42 13.49
Education 29.45 22.43
Income (000’$) 290.00 310.00
Number of Observations: 30438
The variables marked by asterisks are dummy variables. Sex is equal to one for female and
zero for male.
are available in Table 3.2.
The third dataset is provided by the Marketing Management in I.K.Co.
(MMI). This dataset contains 30,438 observations of car owners in Tehran.
Data on owners’ gender, family size, and occupation, along with their car
models are gathered at gas stations. The dataset contains observations of all
types of cars in the market including samples from imported and domestic
cars in 2005.
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Table 3.3: The Production and Market Share
Real Data MMI
Company Car Sales Market Share Sales Market Share
Peykan 90,776 10.86 2636 9.9
Samand 69,223 8.28 2189 8.2
I.K.Co. RD 73,146 8.75 2434 9.1
GLX 119,759 14.33 3342 12.5
Peugeot 206 75,775 9.07 2800 10.5
Pars 37,713 4.51 1231 4.6
Vanet 44,169 5.28 647 2.4
Pride 291,013 34.81 10566 39.3
Xantia 13,008 1.56 511 1.9
SAIPA Rio 2,939 0.35 13 0.05
(Including PARS) Caravan 765 0.09 39 0.1
Nissan 1,858 0.23 174 0.7
Maxima 2,359 0.28 163 0.6
Production and market share of two big companies in 2005
Table 3.3 shows real market shares of a number of cars in the country11.
However, calculated market shares based on the MMI (Table 3.3), which were
gathered in Tehran, are close to the real market shares (Table 3.3). Therefore,
we have used the market shares in the MMI dataset as an approximation of
the real market shares of all cars in the market. The MMI contains 38 car
models, 17 of which are imported; the other 21 are produced by the duopolist
companies. Prices range from 5.5 thousand dollars for Vanet to 43 thousand
dollars for Merc. Chairman. The data on prices are reported by Industrial
Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO).
We used their common factors to link the datasets. We chose the MMI
11The shares were reported by the manufacturers
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as the base dataset and applied serious restrictions in merging them. To insert
new attributes for individuals in the MMI, for example household incomes, we
conducted a two-step procedure. First we found the distribution of income
conditional on family size, occupation and type of purchased car. Then, we
performed a random draw from the obtained conditional distribution. For
example, to do a random draw for a buyer who is a teacher, has a family with
three members and has purchased a Toyota Camry, we used CES to construct
the conditional distribution of income for teachers (as occupation) who own
a Toyota Camry (as type of car) and with family size equal to three. Such
a method enabled us to generate a more accurate final dataset than using an
unconditional random draw from aggregate distributions of the attributes.
The next section provides more insight into the data and the choices of
individuals with respect to their characteristics. A Multinomial Logit model is
employed to see the effects of population attributes on choices in the Iranian
automobile market.
3.3 Empirical Models
Three empirical exercises are performed in this section. The Mutino-
mial Logit estimation shows the role of the attributes of people in their choices
in the Iranian auto market. The BLP methodology was performed to esti-
mate markups which showed that domestic firms are exercising much higher
markups on their products relative to imported car manufacturers. Also, the
marginal cost of each automobile was estimated in this experiment in order
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to perform another counterfactual analysis. This analysis suggests that it is
profitable for neither firm to produce higher quality products, as stated in
Lemma 3
The methods used in this paper, particularly discrete choice models, are
common in the applied Industrial Organization literature. In discrete choice
models, individuals choose from a set of mutually exclusive options to gain
the highest possible utility. In these models, the utilities of alternatives for
individuals depend both on the consumers’ attributes and the characteristics of
the alternatives. However, utilities can not be measured directly when some
of the attributes that influence the utilities are unobservable. In addition,
demographics are used as a proxy for consumer heterogeneity in such models.
The Multinomial Logit model, as in [13], the Nested Logit model, as in [11],
and the Random Coefficients model used by [5] are among the most common
models utilized in the literature.
As previously mentioned, the Multinomial Logit model is frequently
used to estimate random utility maximization problems. Under the assump-
tions of this model, the probabilities of choosing different alternatives are com-
puted as functions of the attributes of the customers. Various authors have
applied the Multinomial Logit model to their papers. For example, [13] ap-
ply the Multinomial Logit model in the coffee market and study the repeat
purchasing behavior of the shoppers. They allow for an additional marginal
utility for future consumption of the already-consumed products to explain the
positive correlation among sales patterns. In an earlier application, [9] used
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the model in the context of transportation planning to explain the decision for
alternative transportation modes (car, bus or etc.). Structurally, the Multi-
nomial Logit model implies that substitution patterns are proportional when
the choice probabilities of alternatives depend only on their own characteris-
tics and are independent of the characteristics of other present choices. As
a result, the Multinomial Logit model fails to give a reasonable explanation
for substitution patterns between different choices in models where utilities
are described as functions of the attributes of the choices or the consumers.
However, this model provides a framework to investigate some counterfactual
analyses such as the effects of population attributes on demands.
To allow for more realistic substitution patterns between alternatives
with acceptable cross-price elasticities of demand, [5] and [4] introduced more
flexible characteristic-based utilities.12 In particular, market-level demand
functions are obtained from aggregating over customer-level demand func-
tions, where utility functions relate market equilibrium prices to the market
shares of goods. In their framework, the interaction between supply and de-
mand on the consumer level determines the equilibrium prices and develops
new methods to estimate costs as well as the demand parameters. The method
has been developed and implemented by many authors for other differentiated
markets. In an interesting application, [27] and [28] used this method for the
US ready-to-eat cereal market and conducted experiments to evaluate mergers
12In the simple Logit framework, all cross price elasticities with respect to the price of
the good i are equal to each other.
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in this market. Similarly, [31] considered extra moments derived from micro
data to identify more precise parameters for the US auto industry.
3.3.1 Multinomial Logit
The Multinomial Logit model is used to investigate the effects of popu-
lation characteristics on demand structure in the Iranian auto market. Utility
from purchasing a car consists of two observable and unobservable terms. A
part of utility from purchasing a car which is observable to an economist
depends on the characteristics of individuals, Xi (including income, age, ed-
ucation, family-size and sex of the buyer in our model). For example, people
with different family-sizes are more likely to pick up different cars. The gen-
eral form of the utility of a person with characteristics (Xi) from choosing
alternative j is expressed as:
Uij = Xiβj + εij (3.3.1)
where the disturbance εij is assumed to be of a type 1 extreme value
distribution. The assumption used in the estimation is to consider mean exoge-
nous utilities for goods and to allow utilities to vary depending on individual
characteristics. These characteristics act as proxies to illustrate the substitu-
tion patterns between different cars. The mean utilities of cars are estimated
through the first entry of βj where the corresponding variable is equal to one
in the Xi vector. [5] computes the probability of choosing alternative j among
J available alternatives by integrating over all possible unobservable errors
97
to calculate the probability of having utility from purchasing good j exceed
utilities of all other goods:





Having access to individual-level data we have information on people
who chose outside option, i.e., they did not purchase any of the products, at
all. Letting the utility of consumption from outside option be zero, we have
resolved the identification issue by comparing utilities from different alterna-
tives with respect to the zero utility of our base product, the outside option.
Estimates from the Iranian auto industry are used to illustrate the marginal
effects of age and income on demand. The effects of income are of interest
to us since the average Iranian real GDP is dependent on exported oil prices,
resulting in a volatile per capita real income. Marginal effects of age are also
considered in this simulation to investigate the effects of changes in average
age of the population.
3.3.2 BLP(Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes)
A simple case of [4] is to consider the following model for utility to
denote the different preferences for the characteristics of products:
U(ζi, pj, xj, ξj; θ) = xjβ̄ − αpj + ξj + εij (3.3.3)
where the utility is composed of the error term, εij, and the mean util-
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ity of purchasing a car defined as:
δj = xjβ̄ − αpj + ξj (3.3.4)
Using the assumption that error terms have i.i.d. extreme value distri-
butions, they express market shares in terms of the mean utilities by integrat-






Using the calculated market shares and knowing that the sum of all
shares should be equal to one, they back out the mean utilities from market
shares as
δj = Ln(sj)− Ln(s0) (3.3.6)
where Ln is the natural logarithm function. Hence, one might estimate
the following equation to obtain the elasticities of prices and characteristics of
the products:
Ln(sj)− Ln(s0) = xjβ̄ − αpj + ξj (3.3.7)
Furthermore, based on assuming Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the





(pj −mcj)Msj(p, x, ξ; θ) (3.3.8)
where mcj is the marginal cost of producing good j, M is the total
number of auto purchases in the market and 	f is the set of cars produced by
firm f . Given these assumptions, any product of firm f must have a price pj
which satisfies the first order condition:
sj(p, x, ξ; θ) +
∑
r∈	j
(pr −mcr)∂sj(p, x, ξ; θ)
∂pj
= 0 (3.3.9)









if r and j are produced by the same firm
0 otherwise
(3.3.10)
to solve and obtain:
p = mc+Δ(p, x, ξ; θ)−1s(P, x, ξ; θ) (3.3.11)
The last equation can be used to investigate the effects of any perturba-
tions in the market structure on equilibrium prices using the estimated costs.
Section 3.4.2 uses this equation to estimate marginal costs of the automobiles





= −αpj(1 − sj) if j = k, otherwise = αpksk. There-
fore, using these estimates of elasticities and assuming a market structure for
competition, Δjr can be calculated from eqution 3.3.10. Given these estimates
of Δjr, marginal costs can be derived by solving equation 3.3.11. Notice that
the estimated costs depend on the assumption made for the market conduct.
As a result, for the robustness check, it is necessary to estimate the marginal
costs with different market structures.
The same equation is used in Section 3.4.3 to conduct a counterfactual
analysis in which market structure is altered in an exercise to allow for high-
low and high-high outcomes. In these experiments, the estimated marginal
costs are fixed and the equation 3.3.11 is solved to derive the optimal pricing
strategies for firms. In the analysis, equilibrium prices and profits are pre-
dicted using the new hypothetical market structure and the estimated costs
from Section 3.4.2. They indicate that the only sustainable equilibrium is the
production of low quality products by both firms.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Multinomial Logit
The multinomial logit model described in Section 3.3 is used to illus-
trate the role of the attributes of consumers on utilities and demands for cars.
The attributes of consumers used in the estimation are sex, family-size, age, ed-
ucation status and income of individuals. Estimation results provided in Table
10 are statistically significant - according to the standard errors in parenthe-
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ses - implying interesting facts about the Iranian market. For example, the
coefficients on the sex of consumers (a dummy variable taking the value of one
for female and zero for male) suggest that females obtain higher utility from
all models of Peugeot 206, Renault, Matiz, and Gol, and derive less utility
from Nissan-Pickup and Sinad. This pattern of taste is widely understood in
the Iranian auto market. Family-size has bigger coefficients for bigger cars
and smaller coefficients for smaller cars, indicating a remarkable correlation
between car size and family-size.
To interpret the coefficients of Table 10, it is instructive to examine
results of two distinctive cars. For example, consider Peugeot 206, a rela-
tively expensive supermini car targeted small families and women, compares
to Peykan, a cheap economic car designed based on Hillman Hunter and are
produced since 1967 by I.k.Co. Interestingly, despite its high sales, the at-
tributes and features of Peykan have remained unchanged for all these years.
First, it is obvious that the sex coefficient is significantly smaller for Peykan
meaning that women prefer 206 to a large extent. Moreover, the estimates
indicate that large families dislike 206, and rich households favor 206 over
Peykan. Finally, the differences between education and age coefficients are
not economically meaningful.
Furthermore, in Table 3.4, we have calculated the marginal effects of
each attribute on the probability of choosing outside option (not purchasing
any new car). Since the probability of choosing a car is proportional to its
market share, marginal effects can be appropriate measures of the changes of
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Table 3.4: Marginal effects for the Multinomial Logit Model
∂y
∂x
% Std. Err. t-test p-value
Sex 6.91 0.05 132.24 0.00
Family size 0.51 0.01 48.34 0.00
Age 0.04 0.00 34.04 0.00
Education -0.04 0.00 -50.56 0.00
Income -0.08 0.43 -1.95 0.05
∂y
∂x is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
market shares due to changes in attributes of the market consumers.
The simulation results suggest that a marginal one unit increase in av-
erage family-size, a marginal one year increase in average age and a marginal
one unit increase in average income - equivalent to one hundred dollars in our
simulation - will result in 0.51%, 0.04% and -0.0008% change respectively in the
probability that an average consumer chooses the outside option. By average
consumer, we mean a consumer with characteristics equal to the average of the
characteristics of all people in the dataset. According to the CES data, almost
6% of households buy new cars every year and 94% of households are people
who don’t buy any new cars, whom we denote as the “outside option buyers”.
Taking into consideration that more than 1,100,000 cars are produced in a
recent year, the mentioned changes in consumer attributes may result in ap-
proximately -83000, -6700 and 130 changes respectively in the number of total
annual car sales. This might be of interest from the policy making perspective
for manufacturers who would like to have estimates of demand changes due
to the changes in population demographics. As an example, the baby-boom
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phenomenon in Iran which resulted in a younger average population trend in
00’s can be an explanation of the decreasing market share of “outside option”
in recent years. Another interesting feature of these estimates is the demand
shift under a change in average income of people. In other words, volatility
of the Iranian real per capita GDP may be a proxy of fluctuation in demand
over different periods which is captured by the estimates.
3.4.2 The BLP Method
The estimates from equation 3.3.7 are presented in Table 3.5 where
all utility parameters have reasonable signs: negative sign for price, positive
sign for safety, and negative sign for weight. These estimates illustrate that the
domestic cars show an average of 4.19 for the own-price elasticity. Interestingly,
the same measure exceeds 8.76 for the foreign cars. Furthermore, estimates
of marginal costs for all cars were computed from equation 3.3.11 in order to
obtain markups for all cars in the market. The estimates of marginal costs
and markups are summarized in Table 3.6.
Comparing markups for different cars, we observe that the markups
are significantly higher for domestic cars, which are distinguished by asterisks
in the Table 3.6. This is an indication that domestic producers are enjoying
high markups which the authors believe are mostly due to the tariff policy
by the Iranian government on auto-products. In 2005, the tariff policy by
the Iranian government levied 70% tariff on intermediary goods which the
domestic manufacturers used in their production lines. On the other hand,
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Table 3.5: The BLP Estimation
Coef. Std. Err. t-test p-value
Price (000’$) -0.449 0.190 -2.360 0.018
Length (mm) -0.009 1.267 -0.010 0.994
Width (mm) -6.130 5.210 -1.180 0.239
Displacement (cm3) 0.013 0.006 2.150 0.032
Number of Cylinders -3.412 1.995 -1.710 0.087
Weight (kg) -0.008 0.004 -2.140 0.033
Safety 3.610 1.866 1.930 0.053
Amenities 1.343 1.520 0.880 0.377
Constant 7.931 11.135 0.710 0.476
Note: Number of observation is equal to 38 and Wald test is χ2(8) = 16.77. The weighted
average own-price elasticity for the imported cars is -8.77 (-3.44, -24.50) and for the domestic
cars is -4.19 (-2.24, -16.78)
tariff on the prices of imported automobiles have consistently been 100%. In
order to make the market more competitive, such that consumer surplus and
total surplus both increase, the government may apply a tariff policy to reduce
the market powers of domestic producers. Therefore, a decrease in tariffs for
imported automobiles is a major aspect that needs further research in order to




This section provides an empirical counterfactual test to show that it is
not profitable for either firms to produce higher quality products in the Iranian
automobile market. For this purpose, we needed to estimate the profits of firms
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Table 3.6: Marginal costs and Markups for Automobiles
Car Markup(%) Marginal Cost($000’s) Car Markup(%) Marginal Cost($000’s)
Peykan 37.40 3.82 Mazda∗ 10.02 19.80
Vanet 41.47 3.22 Pajero∗ 4.08 51.80
RD 33.06 4.62 Renault 44.59 2.74
GLI 22.15 8.02 Maxima 5.97 34.80
206 V2 21.42 8.37 Pickup 9.01 22.30
GLX 18.62 9.97 Vanet Mazda∗ 21.00 8.30
Samand 20.46 8.87 Roniz∗ 7.23 28.30
Samand LX 17.41 10.82 Proton∗ 16.20 11.40
206 v3 19.67 9.32 Sinad∗ 23.25 7.28
206 v5 18.40 10.12 Verna∗ 16.11 11.48
206 v6 16.90 11.22 Gol∗ 16.82 10.90
Pars 14.72 13.22 Musso∗ 5.21 40.12
ELX 13.04 15.22 Merc. Chairman∗ 4.90 42.80
Nasim 33.91 4.40 Corolla∗ 8.16 24.80
Saba 32.21 4.75 Camry∗ 5.34 39.10
Xantia 10.09 20.10 Avante∗ 9.18 21.80
Rio 19.78 9.15 Prado∗ 4.41 47.80
Caravan 18.04 10.25 Cielo∗ 18.53 9.70
Matiz∗ 29.01 5.40 Patrol∗ 14.70 12.80
Imported cars are marked with asterisks. Also, 206 stands for Peugeot 206 in the table.
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for different strategy-pairs, i.e., the profits in Table 3.1. Also, we ranked the
brands of automobiles with respect to their qualities. To do so, we used the
coefficients obtained in the BLP estimation to rank the automobiles based on
the weighted importance of their characteristics, Xjβj. Then, we labeled the
19 cars with higher values of the estimated term (sum of the multiplication
of their characteristics by the corresponding coefficients) as the high quality
products. The remaining 19 automobiles with lower values were designated as
the low quality products. Given that there is no antitrust law in the Iranian
market, we assumed that it is a dominant strategy for both firms to collude in
pricing. Then, we estimated the profits under different choices of qualities as
follows.
First, we assumed that both firms produce high quality products. Given
the estimated marginal costs of the automobiles and the market structure
where only the 19 higher quality products are being manufactured, we used the
first order condition matrix presented in the BLP model (equation 3.3.11).13
This allowed us to calculate the set of equilibrium prices which gives the high-
est possible profit.14 The profits are predicted by equation 3.3.8 given prices.
13This experiment is based on the marginal costs estimated in Section 3.4.2. One concern
is that the collusion assumption made to estimate the marginal costs might misrepresent
the real structure of the marker. To address this issue and to check the robustness of the
results, we employ the same procedure proposed here but with different assumptions on the
market structure. Appendix .2 describes these robustness checks.
14Notice that equation 3.3.11 is a non-linear function of prices because a new price equilib-
rium would change the market shares as well as the markups. It requires to solve for the all
prices at the same time. This complex non-linear optimization problem is not solvable when
the number of goods/markets are considerably large or if the utility has random coefficient
components
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Estimated counterfactual profits in million Dollars for the Iranain auto industry. All profits
are calculated by the assumption that firms are colluding.
It suggests that in such a market each firm would obtain a profit equal to
7.6 million Dollars in 2005. Second, we considered the case when a company
produces higher quality products and the other produces the lower quality
automobiles. Using the same profit function and estimating the equilibrium
prices under the new market structure, the counterfactual analysis indicated
that the higher quality producer would obtain 53.3 million Dollars and the
other lower quality producer would get 14.5 million Dollars in equilibrium.
Similarly, we estimated equilibrium profits for the case when both firms pro-
duce the 19 lower quality cars and predicted 27.0 million Dollars for each.
Considering all the projected profits under different strategies in Table 3.7,
we can see that the only sustainable Nash equilibrium of the game is when
both firms produce lower quality products and the higher quality automobiles’
production is a strictly dominated strategy.
Tariff Reduction
Another interesting experiment is to evaluate the impact of a tariff
reduction on the market equilibrium. As stated before, the imported cars
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constitute about half of the brands in the market, while their sales amount
only 2% of the market. They are not essentially luxury cars and include also
economic cars like Camry and Mazda. Moreover, the car manufacturing is
recognized as a protected industry, and thus, the Iranian government imposes
a tariff rate of over 100% on importing cars. This barrier to trade appears as
an additional cost to production. Therefore, it may dissuade importers from
supplying in the market. In the absence of high quality cars, the low-quality
domestic products entice many high-taste consumers. Consequently, there
is no competition to force the domestic firms to improve the quality. As a
result, there is some debate whether high tariff rates contribute to low-quality
domestic products.
In order to evaluate the impact of the high tariff rate, we conduct two
experiments when the marginal cost of the imported cars reduced by 20%
and 30%. This doesn’t necessarily imply that the tariff rates are cut by the
same amount. Indeed, these measures can be reached by somewhat extensive
reduction in tariffs. Finally, similar to the previous section all equilibrium
outcomes are computed assuming the firms colluding on their pricing policy.15
Table 3.8 shows the result of a game when the marginal costs reduced
by 20% and 30%. Interestingly, the left panel illustrates that a reduction
15An identical robustness check as Appendix .2 indicates that this result remains un-
changed when estimating the marginal costs with a different set of assumptions for market
conduct
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Table 3.8: Profit for Counterfactual Quality Game
20% cut 30% cut
Low Hight Low High
Low (29.35,29.35) (56.92,35.91) (32.00,32.00) (44.83,19.52)
High (35.91,56.92) (18.87,18.87) (19.52,44.83) (78.16,78.16)
The counterfactural experiments with 20% and 30% cut on the marginal costs of the im-
ported cars.
of 20% changes the equilibrium outcome from the low-low product to the
high-low market. Moreover, a further reduction in the marginal costs of the
imported cars leads to the high-high equilibrium. Importantly, we do not
claim that by this change in the tariff rates, the domestic companies certainly
produce high quality cars. In fact, we cannot answer this question because the
adoption of a new technology is beyond the scope of our model and remains
as an important topic for future research. What we can assert is that with
the current technology a reduction in the tariff rates promotes either the more
imports of foreign cars or a domestic production of high quality cars or both,
such that the market is no longer supplied by low quality products.
3.5 Conclusion
The Iranian automobile market is an example of oligopolistic differen-
tiated products market with two major domestic manufacturers and a num-
ber of importing firms. This paper considers the Iranian auto market as a
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case study and provides a framework to explain the structure of the market.
The theoretical model shows how firms may choose to produce lower quality
products rather than highly differentiated qualities. Counterfactual empir-
ical analyses confirmed the theoretical hypothesis that both domestic firms
preferred to manufacture lower quality products by comparing the projected
profits under different market structures. Furthermore, empirical estimations
based on BLP (1995) suggested that domestic producers are enjoying higher
markups relative to the importing firms. The pattern of estimated markups
also showed evidence that they are considerably higher for lower quality goods
and imply that domestic companies collude in pricing their products. The es-
timation procedure was performed in two steps, providing precise estimations
of marginal costs, and recovering the markups based on estimated costs in the
second stage.
Further interesting extensions - some of which are being currently in-
vestigated by the authors - can be done by future researchers. More thorough
analyses on markups and more precise estimations can be done by using panel
data and taking the intertemporal production and pricing into account. In
particular, future research may focus on dynamic aspects of the automobile
market to more accurately separate the quality and pricing decisions of the
producers. Merger analysis can be done to analyze the effects of the merger
between different companies. Furthermore, using the market structure and
the estimates of markups, it is interesting to analyze the profitability of the
production of a common product by companies. Such an example have ex-
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isted in recent years where the two largest companies(I.K.Co. and Saipa) have




.1 Dynamic Theory Model
In this appendix, we propose a dynamic version of the quality-price
competition similar to what is described in Section 3.1. The goal of this
appendix is to relax assumption 2 and to study under what conditions firms
tend to collude in pricing. To explore this issue, we assume that in period
zero firms decide on what quality to produce. After the firms determine their
qualities, in all following periods t = 1, 2, · · · they playing a Bertrand pricing
game. Firms discount future profits at the rate δ. In particular, we study
the trigger strategy equilibria, in which firms play the duopoly competition
after an occurrence of any deviation. More formally, if σcollusion stands for the
strategy associated with collusion, the trigger strategy is defined as:
σt =
{
σcollusion if σt−1 = σcollusion
σcompetition if σt−1 
= σcollusion
The Folk Theorem of repeated games establishes that there is a minimum
discount rate δ∗ such that for all δ > δ∗ the trigger strategy deters firms from
any deviation. To find the δ∗, it requires to employ the one-shot deviation
principle. In fact, three equilibria can be recognized when firms have decided
to produce low-low, high-high, and low-high qualities. In case of any deviation,
When firms producing same qualities they achieve zero profits because of the
Bertrand competition on prices. Therefore, one can simply use the one-shot







Moreover, when qualities are high-low, since the profit of collusion is greater
than the competition, and the static profit of deviation exceeds the profit
of collusion, by the Folk Theorem there exist a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) deviation from collusion is not profitable. It is straightforward to
show that δ∗ = π
deviation−πcollusion
πdeviation−πcompetition . In sum, if both firms are enough patient
then the trigger strategy can support the collusion equilibrium similar to what
considered in assumption 2.
.2 Counterfactuals With Other Market Structure
In Section 3.4, the underlying assumption of the counterfactual exper-
iment is that the two domestic firms in the Iranian auto market collude in
their pricing, when the marginal costs are estimated. However, one might ar-
gue that this assumption can potentially bias the results. Therefore, in this
appendix the same procedure is employed with various market structures when
estimating the marginal costs. After estimating new marginal costs, the same
experiment is run to obtain prices and profits for each game.
The results of this exercise is shown in Table 9. It is important to stress
that the market conduct for each table is the assumption used to compute the
marginal costs. Notwithstanding, the profits reported in each equilibrium is
the outcome of an experiment when firms are colluding. These tables highlight
that the assumption made for the market structure to compute the marginal
costs has negligible effects on our conclusions. In other words, in all market
structures presented in Table 9 firms prefer to produce low quality cars.
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Table 9: Profit in Quality Game (Other Market Structure)
Doupoly Structure Domestic Collusion Structure
Low Hight Low High
Low (27.44,27.44) (54.18,14.84) (28.20,28.20) (55.67,15.17)
High (14.84,54.18) (7.79,7.79) (15.17,55.67) (7.97,7.97)
Collusion Structure Competition Structure
Low Hight Low High
Low (28.42,28.42) (56.10,15.32) (27.00,27.00) (53.32,14.45)
High (15.32,56.10) (8.05,8.05) (14.45,53.32) (7.58,7.58)
The counterfactural experiments with different assumptions on the market structure. These
market assumptions are used to back out the marginal costs similar to what implemented at
Section 3.4.2. The top-left panel is for competition between two domestic firms and single
product firms for the imported cars. The next top panel shows the results when marginal
costs are derived by the assumption that the two domestic firms collude while importers
competes. The down panels shows the results for the case that all firms compete or collude
respectively. The numbers are in Million $ profit.
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